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 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠ European	
 ﾠ Union	
 ﾠ (EU)	
 ﾠ recently	
 ﾠ implemented	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠ
Liability	
 ﾠDirective	
 ﾠ(ELD),	
 ﾠrequiring	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠso	
 ﾠ
that	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠaffected	
 ﾠenvironment	
 ﾠreturns	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ(or	
 ﾠtoward)	
 ﾠits	
 ﾠbaseline	
 ﾠcondition	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠcompensated	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinitial	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠduring	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
time	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ takes	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ environment	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ recover	
 ﾠ (interim	
 ﾠ losses).	
 ﾠ Equivalency	
 ﾠ
Analysis	
 ﾠ(EA)	
 ﾠrepresents	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmethod	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
offset	
 ﾠ interim	
 ﾠ losses.	
 ﾠ Ensuring	
 ﾠ appropriate	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ loss	
 ﾠ
requires	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmerging	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠmeasurement	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtheories	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠ
economics.	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠthesis	
 ﾠexplores	
 ﾠsome	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠissues	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthree	
 ﾠpapers.	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠquantitative	
 ﾠapplication	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠ
method	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠcompensate	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠsea	
 ﾠeagle	
 ﾠmortality	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠturbine	
 ﾠcollisions.	
 ﾠIt	
 ﾠ
is	
 ﾠ co-ﾭ‐authored	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ biologist	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ proposes	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠn e w 	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠi n n o v a t i v e 	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠ measure	
 ﾠ based	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ electrocution	
 ﾠ prevention	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ power	
 ﾠ lines.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Paper	
 ﾠ II	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠw r i t t e n 	
 ﾠf o r 	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠ ecological	
 ﾠ readership	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ communicates	
 ﾠ
fundamental	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠassumptions	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠway	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠmight	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠhelpful	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐
discipline	
 ﾠcollaboration.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠmain	
 ﾠcontribution	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠclarify	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠunderlying	
 ﾠ
goal	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠshould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠ"no	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwelfare."	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠ
III	
 ﾠs c rutinizes	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ conventional	
 ﾠ EA	
 ﾠ method	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠs o c i a l 	
 ﾠe f f i c i e n c y 	
 ﾠ
perspective,	
 ﾠsuggesting	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfocus	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠequity	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvictim	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠpreclude	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ
socially	
 ﾠoptimal	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠoutcome.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠoverarching	
 ﾠconclusion	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠ
EA	
 ﾠfails	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠinform	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠmakers	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinescapable	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐offs	
 ﾠ
that	
 ﾠarise	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠcompensating	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠlosses.	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠ coincidence	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ prefixes	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ two	
 ﾠ subjects	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ thoroughly	
 ﾠ
appropriate.	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ Greek	
 ﾠ root	
 ﾠ means	
 ﾠ household	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ signifies	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ
interacting	
 ﾠ set	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ activities,	
 ﾠ both	
 ﾠ complementary	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ
competitive	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠeach	
 ﾠother.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠpredator	
 ﾠbenefits	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠgrowth	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
both	
 ﾠnumbers	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ size	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ prey,	
 ﾠ yet	
 ﾠ one	
 ﾠ cannot	
 ﾠ say	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ relation	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ
entirely	
 ﾠbeneficial	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlatter.	
 ﾠOne	
 ﾠnation	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠgain	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠgrowth	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
other	
 ﾠ nations	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ increased	
 ﾠ exports	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ them	
 ﾠ but	
 ﾠ also	
 ﾠ lose	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ they	
 ﾠ
compete	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠscarce	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠoil.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
—	
 ﾠ Kenneth	
 ﾠ Arrow	
 ﾠ (2007)	
 ﾠ Nobel	
 ﾠ prize	
 ﾠ winner	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ economics	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ guest	
 ﾠ
editorial	
 ﾠentitled	
 ﾠ"Eco(nomics/logy)"	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠjournal	
 ﾠ"Ecological	
 ﾠResearch"	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
“...	
 ﾠl e t 	
 ﾠus 	
 ﾠgo	
 ﾠbe y ond	
 ﾠme r e 	
 ﾠs al v age 	
 ﾠt o	
 ﾠbe gi n	
 ﾠt he 	
 ﾠr e s t or at i on	
 ﾠof 	
 ﾠnat ur al 	
 ﾠ
environments,	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ order	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ enlarge	
 ﾠ wild	
 ﾠ populations	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ stanch	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
hemorrhaging	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ biological	
 ﾠ wealth.	
 ﾠ There	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ no	
 ﾠ purpose	
 ﾠ more	
 ﾠ
enspiriting	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbegin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠage	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠrestoration,	
 ﾠreweaving	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwondrous	
 ﾠ
diversity	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠlife	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠstill	
 ﾠsurrounds	
 ﾠus.”	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
—	
 ﾠE.O.	
 ﾠWilson	
 ﾠ(1992)	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠDiversity	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠLife	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
Contents	
 ﾠ
List	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠPublications	
 ﾠ 6	
 ﾠ
Abbreviations	
 ﾠ 7	
 ﾠ
1	
 ﾠ Introduction	
 ﾠ 9	
 ﾠ
2	
 ﾠ Purpose	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠObjective	
 ﾠ 15	
 ﾠ
3	
 ﾠ Economics	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠCompensation	
 ﾠ 17	
 ﾠ
3.1	
 ﾠ Equivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ(EA)	
 ﾠ 18	
 ﾠ
3.2	
 ﾠ Measuring	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ 19	
 ﾠ
3.2.1	
 ﾠ A	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠ 19	
 ﾠ
3.2.2	
 ﾠ A	
 ﾠcurrency	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠvaluing	
 ﾠtrades	
 ﾠ 21	
 ﾠ
3.2.3	
 ﾠ Sufficient	
 ﾠscale	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ 23	
 ﾠ
3.2.4	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠmechanism	
 ﾠ 25	
 ﾠ
3.2.5	
 ﾠ Aggregating	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠpreferences	
 ﾠ 26	
 ﾠ
3.2.6	
 ﾠ Who	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠpaying	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠwho	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvictim?	
 ﾠ 29	
 ﾠ
3.2.7	
 ﾠ Accounting	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠtime:	
 ﾠdiscounting	
 ﾠ 30	
 ﾠ
4	
 ﾠ My	
 ﾠcontribution	
 ﾠ 33	
 ﾠ
4.1	
 ﾠ Paper	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ"Scaling	
 ﾠelectrocution	
 ﾠprevention	
 ﾠmeasures..."	
 ﾠ 33	
 ﾠ
4.2	
 ﾠ Paper	
 ﾠII	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ"Wind	
 ﾠpower	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbirds	
 ﾠ..."	
 ﾠ 34	
 ﾠ
4.3	
 ﾠ Paper	
 ﾠIII	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ"Equity	
 ﾠover	
 ﾠefficiency..."	
 ﾠ 35	
 ﾠ
4.3.1	
 ﾠ Critique	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠ 36	
 ﾠ
4.3.2	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠproposed	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠ 36	
 ﾠ
4.3.3	
 ﾠ Implications	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠanalysis	
 ﾠ 37	
 ﾠ
4.3.4	
 ﾠ Conclusion	
 ﾠ 38	
 ﾠ
4.4	
 ﾠ Suggestions	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠfuture	
 ﾠresearch	
 ﾠ 39	
 ﾠ
References	
 ﾠ 41	
 ﾠ
Acknowledgements	
 ﾠ 44	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 6	
 ﾠ
List	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠPublications	
 ﾠ
This	
 ﾠthesis	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠsupported	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠpart	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠwork	
 ﾠcontained	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfollowing	
 ﾠ
papers,	
 ﾠreferred	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠRoman	
 ﾠnumerals	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtext:	
 ﾠ
I  Cole,	
 ﾠScott	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠEspen	
 ﾠLie	
 ﾠDahl	
 ﾠ(2012).	
 ﾠ"Scaling	
 ﾠelectrocution	
 ﾠ
prevention	
 ﾠmeasures	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠcompensate	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠwhite-ﾭ‐tailed	
 ﾠeagle	
 ﾠ(WTE)	
 ﾠ
mortality	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠSmøla	
 ﾠwind-ﾭ‐power	
 ﾠplant,	
 ﾠNorway."	
 ﾠ
(Submission	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠinterdisciplinary	
 ﾠjournal	
 ﾠplanned	
 ﾠMay	
 ﾠ2012)	
 ﾠ
II  Cole,	
 ﾠScott	
 ﾠ(2011).	
 ﾠWind	
 ﾠpower	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbirds:	
 ﾠ
An	
 ﾠopinion	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠeconomist.	
 ﾠJournal	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠRestoration	
 ﾠ
Ecology.	
 ﾠVolume	
 ﾠ19,	
 ﾠNumber	
 ﾠ2.	
 ﾠMarch.	
 ﾠ
III Cole,	
 ﾠScott	
 ﾠ(2012).	
 ﾠEquity	
 ﾠover	
 ﾠefficiency:	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠproblem	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcredibility	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
scaling	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠcompensation?	
 ﾠ(Submission	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠ
journal	
 ﾠplanned	
 ﾠMay	
 ﾠ2012)	
 ﾠ
Papers	
 ﾠII	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠreproduced	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠpermission.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 7	
 ﾠ
Abbreviations	
 ﾠ
BYs	
 ﾠ Bird	
 ﾠYears	
 ﾠ
CBA	
 ﾠ Cost-ﾭ‐benefit	
 ﾠanalysis	
 ﾠ
CERCLA	
 ﾠ Comprehensive	
 ﾠEnvironmental	
 ﾠResponse,	
 ﾠCompensation	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠLiability	
 ﾠAct	
 ﾠ(US)	
 ﾠ
CV	
 ﾠ Compensating	
 ﾠVariation	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
DBYs	
 ﾠ Discounted	
 ﾠBird	
 ﾠYears	
 ﾠ
EA	
 ﾠ Equivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ
EIA	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠImpact	
 ﾠAssessment	
 ﾠ
ELD	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠLiability	
 ﾠDirective	
 ﾠ
EU	
 ﾠ European	
 ﾠUnion	
 ﾠ
HEA	
 ﾠ Habitat	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ
HH	
 ﾠ Household	
 ﾠ
NINA	
 ﾠ Norway	
 ﾠInstitute	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠNature	
 ﾠResearch	
 ﾠ
OPA	
 ﾠ Oil	
 ﾠPollution	
 ﾠAct	
 ﾠ(US)	
 ﾠ
PPP	
 ﾠ Polluter	
 ﾠpays	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠ
REA	
 ﾠ Resource	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ
REMEDE	
 ﾠ Resource	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠMethods	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠAssessing	
 ﾠ
Environmental	
 ﾠDamage	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠEU	
 ﾠ(www.envliability.eu)	
 ﾠ
SWF	
 ﾠ Social	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠfunction	
 ﾠ
VEA	
 ﾠ Value	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ
VPP	
 ﾠ Victim	
 ﾠpays	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠ
WTA	
 ﾠ Willingness	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠaccept	
 ﾠ
WTP	
 ﾠ Willingness	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠpay	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 8	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
This	
 ﾠpage	
 ﾠpurposely	
 ﾠleft	
 ﾠblank.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 9	
 ﾠ
1  Introduction	
 ﾠ
There	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠincreasing	
 ﾠdemand	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠgovernments	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠassess	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠchange.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠSpecifically,	
 ﾠthere	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ
demand	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ improve	
 ﾠ methods	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ quantify	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ effects	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ ecological	
 ﾠ
change	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ ways	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ facilitate	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ valuation	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ change	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ
economists,	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ final	
 ﾠ use	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ policy-ﾭ‐makers.	
 ﾠ Such	
 ﾠ methods	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ
commonly	
 ﾠused	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠCost-ﾭ‐Benefit	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ(CBA)	
 ﾠwhere,	
 ﾠ
for	
 ﾠ example,	
 ﾠ policy-ﾭ‐makers	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ want	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ evaluate	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ potential	
 ﾠ net	
 ﾠ
benefits	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnew	
 ﾠroad,	
 ﾠbridge,	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠfarm	
 ﾠdevelopment	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠ
other	
 ﾠinfrastructure	
 ﾠproject.	
 ﾠBut	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠmethods	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠequally	
 ﾠimportant	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ equally	
 ﾠ high	
 ﾠ demand	
 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠf o r 	
 ﾠa s s e s s i n g 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠm a g n i t u d e 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpurpose	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠappropriate	
 ﾠamounts	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ (ten	
 ﾠ Kate	
 ﾠ 2004;	
 ﾠ McKenney	
 ﾠ 2005;	
 ﾠ
Englen	
 ﾠ2008).	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ refers	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ provision	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠoffset	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamage.	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠcontrast	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠ financial	
 ﾠ compensation,	
 ﾠ where	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ mechanism	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
cash	
 ﾠpayment,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfocus	
 ﾠhere	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠuse	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠ
provided	
 ﾠthrough	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠrestoration	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠpreservation	
 ﾠproject.	
 ﾠFor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠunintended	
 ﾠrelease	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠoil	
 ﾠinto	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠwetland	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠlead	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠprovision	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠform	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠeither	
 ﾠ(a)	
 ﾠimproving	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
on-ﾭ‐site	
 ﾠ post-ﾭ‐spill	
 ﾠ level	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ services	
 ﾠ through	
 ﾠ habitat	
 ﾠ
restoration;	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ (b)	
 ﾠ purchasing	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ protecting	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ nearby	
 ﾠ wetland	
 ﾠ
threatened	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠdevelopment;	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠ(c)	
 ﾠre-ﾭ‐constructing	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠwetland	
 ﾠ(on-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠ
off-ﾭ‐site)	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠprovides	
 ﾠsimilar	
 ﾠservices	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠspill.	
 ﾠ
Another	
 ﾠ example	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ focus	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ lost	
 ﾠr e c r e a t i o n a l 	
 ﾠu s e 	
 ﾠ( e . g . , 	
 ﾠreduced	
 ﾠ
fishing	
 ﾠdays)	
 ﾠfollowing	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠchemical	
 ﾠspill	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpopular	
 ﾠsport	
 ﾠfishing	
 ﾠlake.	
 ﾠ
Compensation	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠcase	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠinvolve	
 ﾠimproving	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfishery	
 ﾠ(on-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠ
off-ﾭ‐site)	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠimproving	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠaccess	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠalternative	
 ﾠfishing	
 ﾠsites.	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠthird	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 10	
 ﾠ
example	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠprovided	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠI,	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠreduce	
 ﾠsea	
 ﾠeagle	
 ﾠ
electrocution	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ nearby	
 ﾠ power	
 ﾠ lines	
 ﾠi s 	
 ﾠs u g g e s t e d 	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ compensate	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ
eagle	
 ﾠmortality	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠturbine	
 ﾠcollisions.1	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠrequirements	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠrise	
 ﾠglobally,	
 ﾠ
though	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ entirely	
 ﾠ new.2	
 ﾠ In	
 ﾠ addition	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ long-ﾭ‐established	
 ﾠ
Natural	
 ﾠ Resource	
 ﾠ Damage	
 ﾠ Assessment	
 ﾠ regulations	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ US3,	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
European	
 ﾠ Union	
 ﾠ (EU)	
 ﾠ implemented	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠ Liability	
 ﾠ
Directive	
 ﾠ(ELD,	
 ﾠEC/35/2004),	
 ﾠrequiring	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠ
remediated	
 ﾠ(restored)	
 ﾠso	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠaffected	
 ﾠenvironment	
 ﾠreturns	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ(or	
 ﾠ
toward)	
 ﾠits	
 ﾠbaseline	
 ﾠcondition	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠcompensated	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
initial	
 ﾠ damage	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ losses	
 ﾠ during	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ time	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ takes	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠ
environment	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠrecover	
 ﾠ(interim	
 ﾠlosses).	
 ﾠSome	
 ﾠinternational	
 ﾠtreaties	
 ﾠ
also	
 ﾠ address	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ (Mason,	
 ﾠ 2003).	
 ﾠ In	
 ﾠ other	
 ﾠ cases,	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ required	
 ﾠ before	
 ﾠ undertaking	
 ﾠ development	
 ﾠ
projects	
 ﾠ (ex	
 ﾠ ante	
 ﾠc o m p e n s a t i o n).	
 ﾠ There	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ also	
 ﾠ examples	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ facilitate	
 ﾠ permit	
 ﾠ approval,	
 ﾠ so-ﾭ‐called	
 ﾠ
"permitted	
 ﾠinjuries"	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠexchange	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠimprovements	
 ﾠon-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ
or	
 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐site	
 ﾠ(Allen	
 ﾠet	
 ﾠal	
 ﾠ2005;	
 ﾠPeacock	
 ﾠ2007).	
 ﾠFinally,	
 ﾠgovernments	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠ
increasingly	
 ﾠ concerned	
 ﾠ about	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ rate	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ global	
 ﾠ biodiversity	
 ﾠ decline	
 ﾠ
(ten	
 ﾠ Kate,	
 ﾠ 2004;	
 ﾠ McKenney	
 ﾠ 2005).	
 ﾠ Biodiversity	
 ﾠ offsets	
 ﾠ represent	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠmechanism	
 ﾠaimed	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠaddressing	
 ﾠsociety's	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠ
(Ozdemiroglu	
 ﾠet	
 ﾠal	
 ﾠ2009).	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
A	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠassessment	
 ﾠ(or	
 ﾠ"damage	
 ﾠassessment")	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠinevitably	
 ﾠ
an	
 ﾠinterdisciplinary	
 ﾠchallenge:	
 ﾠeconomists	
 ﾠcannot	
 ﾠassess	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠimpact	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠ damage	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ individual's	
 ﾠ well-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠ without	
 ﾠ first	
 ﾠ
trying	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠexplain	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠexpected	
 ﾠdecline	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠecosystem	
 ﾠservices,	
 ﾠusually	
 ﾠ
with	
 ﾠreference	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠbaseline	
 ﾠcondition	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠother	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠfactors	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠ
are	
 ﾠ meaningful	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ human	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ assessment	
 ﾠ (see	
 ﾠ "ecological	
 ﾠ
endpoints"	
 ﾠBoyd	
 ﾠ2006).	
 ﾠThat	
 ﾠis,	
 ﾠeconomists	
 ﾠmust	
 ﾠrely	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlanguage	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠecology	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠexplain	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠattributes	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠexpected	
 ﾠoutcomes	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠproposed	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠ projects.	
 ﾠ Table	
 ﾠ 1	
 ﾠi d e n t i f i e s 	
 ﾠs o m e 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠr e l e v a n t 	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
1	
 ﾠFor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠSwedish	
 ﾠexample	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠex	
 ﾠante	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠcompensation,	
 ﾠsee	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠBotniabana	
 ﾠ
railroad	
 ﾠ project	
 ﾠ (Banverket	
 ﾠ 2006).	
 ﾠ Rundcrantz	
 ﾠ (2006)	
 ﾠ summarizes	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ
within	
 ﾠSwedish	
 ﾠroad	
 ﾠconstruction.	
 ﾠ
2	
 ﾠOne	
 ﾠcommenter	
 ﾠnotes	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠissues	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ'in-ﾭ‐kind'	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠarisen	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcase	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
hydropower	
 ﾠdevelopment	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSweden	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠearly	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ1950s,	
 ﾠthough	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠexperiencing	
 ﾠ
a	
 ﾠresurgence	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠsorts	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠrecent	
 ﾠyears.	
 ﾠ
3	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ NRDA	
 ﾠ regulations	
 ﾠ apply	
 ﾠ under	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ 1980	
 ﾠ Comprehensive	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠ
Response,	
 ﾠCompensation,	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠLiability	
 ﾠAct,	
 ﾠCERCLA	
 ﾠ(see	
 ﾠ42	
 ﾠU.S.C.	
 ﾠ9607(f))	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
1990	
 ﾠOil	
 ﾠPollution	
 ﾠAct,	
 ﾠOPA	
 ﾠ(see	
 ﾠ33	
 ﾠU.S.C.	
 ﾠSec.	
 ﾠ2706(d)(1)).	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 11	
 ﾠ
questions	
 ﾠaddressed	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdifferent	
 ﾠdisciplines	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠassessment.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
Table	
 ﾠ1	
 ﾠInterdisciplinary	
 ﾠcontributions	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠassessment	
 ﾠ
Economics	
 ﾠ
•  identify	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmeans	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠmeasuring	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠ
•  convey	
 ﾠscientific	
 ﾠinformation	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐makers	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmeaningful	
 ﾠway	
 ﾠ
•  measure	
 ﾠindividuals'	
 ﾠwillingness	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠsubstitute	
 ﾠlost	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠgained	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠ
•  highlight	
 ﾠdistributional	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠ('winners	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠlosers')	
 ﾠ
•  develop	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠmethods	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠmeet	
 ﾠdeterrent	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠgoals	
 ﾠ
Ecology	
 ﾠ
•  quantify	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠusing	
 ﾠ"ecological	
 ﾠendpoints"	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠconducive	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠvaluation	
 ﾠ
•  identify	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠmotivate	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠselection	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠrestoration	
 ﾠprojects	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
•  monitor	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠreport	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsuccess	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠrestoration	
 ﾠprojects	
 ﾠover	
 ﾠtime	
 ﾠ
Law	
 ﾠ(both	
 ﾠinternational	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠnational)	
 ﾠ
•  assesses	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtype	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠscope	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠactivities	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠface	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠrequirements	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
•  interpret	
 ﾠguidelines	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠrestoration	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠmethods	
 ﾠ(e.g.,	
 ﾠAnnex	
 ﾠII	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠELD)	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Ethical	
 ﾠ
•  debate	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠintervention	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠsystems	
 ﾠ(Hilderbrand	
 ﾠet	
 ﾠal	
 ﾠ2005)	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
While	
 ﾠ there	
 ﾠa r e 	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ number	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ synonyms	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ
compensation4	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠeach	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠhave	
 ﾠdifferent	
 ﾠlegal	
 ﾠmeanings	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ
this	
 ﾠ study	
 ﾠ assumes	
 ﾠ one	
 ﾠ distinguishing	
 ﾠ characteristic:	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
beneficiary	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ society	
 ﾠ itself.	
 ﾠ Compensation	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ anthropocentric	
 ﾠ
concept	
 ﾠaimed	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠsociety's	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠor,	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠspecifically,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐
being	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠwithin	
 ﾠsociety,	
 ﾠincluding	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠfuture	
 ﾠ
generations	
 ﾠ( s e e 	
 ﾠP a p e r 	
 ﾠI ) .	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ consistent	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ generally	
 ﾠ
accepted	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠnorm	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠharmed,	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠharm	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠ
compensated	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ providing	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ something	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠl i e u 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠ
his/her	
 ﾠfirst	
 ﾠchoice.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ Another	
 ﾠway	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠexpressing	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠsay	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠ
per	
 ﾠse	
 ﾠdoes	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠhave	
 ﾠmeaning	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠworld	
 ﾠdevoid	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠexistence,	
 ﾠ
just	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠ'sustainability'	
 ﾠwould	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠexist	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠconcept	
 ﾠwithout	
 ﾠmankind.5	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
4	
 ﾠe.g.,	
 ﾠcompensatory/complementary	
 ﾠremediation	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠrestoration,	
 ﾠbiodiversity	
 ﾠoffsets,
	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠrestoration,	
 ﾠrehabilitation	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠreplacement,	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠratios,	
 ﾠno	
 ﾠ
net	
 ﾠloss,	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠgain,	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠmitigation,	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠmeasures,	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠ
liability,	
 ﾠetc	
 ﾠ
5	
 ﾠSome	
 ﾠargue	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠintegrity	
 ﾠshould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠmaintained	
 ﾠ'for	
 ﾠits	
 ﾠown	
 ﾠsake,'	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠ
is,	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠitself,	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠreflection	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠ(or	
 ﾠsocietal)	
 ﾠpreferences.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 12	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠimplication	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠour	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠmethods	
 ﾠwill	
 ﾠreflect	
 ﾠ
this	
 ﾠhuman-ﾭ‐centric	
 ﾠview.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠmethods	
 ﾠassessed	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠstudy	
 ﾠ
assume	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠprimary	
 ﾠgoal	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠno	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠwelfare,	
 ﾠalthough	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
some	
 ﾠ cases	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ simplifying	
 ﾠ assumption	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ made	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ impacts	
 ﾠ
move	
 ﾠproportionately	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠmetrics	
 ﾠ(Paper	
 ﾠII).	
 ﾠBut	
 ﾠ
this	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠrestrictive	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠfails	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠaccount	
 ﾠfor,	
 ﾠamong	
 ﾠother	
 ﾠ
things,	
 ﾠnonlinear	
 ﾠeffects	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠtipping	
 ﾠ
points.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠfocus	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠrather	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠpure	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠ
need	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ preclude	
 ﾠe c o l o g i c a l 	
 ﾠ( o r 	
 ﾠe v e n 	
 ﾠe t h i c a l ) 	
 ﾠm o tivations	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ
compensation,	
 ﾠa s 	
 ﾠsociety's	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ depends	
 ﾠ critically	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ ecosystem	
 ﾠ
services	
 ﾠ such	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ biodiversity,	
 ﾠ nutrient	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ carbon	
 ﾠ cycling,	
 ﾠ water	
 ﾠ
purification,	
 ﾠflood	
 ﾠcontrol,	
 ﾠprovision	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠrecreation,	
 ﾠet c	
 ﾠ(TEEB	
 ﾠ2010).	
 ﾠ
Further,	
 ﾠ one	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ posit	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ mankind	
 ﾠ shoulders	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ ethical	
 ﾠ
responsibility	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ protect	
 ﾠ species	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ their	
 ﾠ habitat	
 ﾠ( s e e 	
 ﾠfootnote	
 ﾠ
previous	
 ﾠ page).	
 ﾠ However,	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ focus	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ human	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠwill,	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠmost	
 ﾠ
cases6,	
 ﾠaddress	
 ﾠthese	
 ﾠancillary	
 ﾠissues	
 ﾠbecause	
 ﾠrestoration	
 ﾠprojects	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠ
compensate	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ human	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ losses	
 ﾠ inevitably	
 ﾠ benefit	
 ﾠ ecological	
 ﾠ
resources,	
 ﾠwhile	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠdemonstrating	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠethical	
 ﾠresponsibility.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠstudy's	
 ﾠpoint	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠdeparture	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠanalyzing	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ(EA)	
 ﾠmethod.	
 ﾠIt	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠbeen	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpredominant	
 ﾠ
method	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠUS	
 ﾠsince	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐1990s	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠlikely	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠincrease	
 ﾠdue	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ requirements	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ several	
 ﾠ EU	
 ﾠ Directives	
 ﾠ aimed	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠ(Lipton	
 ﾠet	
 ﾠal	
 ﾠ2008).7	
 ﾠAs	
 ﾠdescribed	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSection	
 ﾠ3.1,	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
divided	
 ﾠ into	
 ﾠ three	
 ﾠ typologies:	
 ﾠ Habitat	
 ﾠ Equivalency	
 ﾠ Analysis	
 ﾠ (HEA),	
 ﾠ
Resource	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ(REA)	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠValue	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠanalysis	
 ﾠ
(VEA).	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Flores	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠThacher	
 ﾠ2002	
 ﾠ(p.	
 ﾠ174)	
 ﾠdescribe	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠequality	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠ
must	
 ﾠ hold	
 ﾠ following	
 ﾠ compensation,	
 ﾠ where	
 ﾠ Vi0(.)	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ i's	
 ﾠ
indirect	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠfunction	
 ﾠprior	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠVi1(.)	
 ﾠ
reflects	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠafter	
 ﾠscenario:	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠVi0(E,E0,yi)	
 ﾠ=	
 ﾠVi1(E	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠL,	
 ﾠE0	
 ﾠ+	
 ﾠR,	
 ﾠyi)	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ (1)	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
6	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠkey	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠhere	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠadequately	
 ﾠinformed	
 ﾠabout	
 ﾠ
how	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠaffects	
 ﾠhis/her	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being.	
 ﾠGiven	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠextent	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠresearch	
 ﾠ
into	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠecosystems,	
 ﾠthere	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠreason	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
believe	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠdifficult,	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠimpossible,	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠtypical	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠadequately	
 ﾠ
informed.	
 ﾠ
7	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠaddition	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠELD,	
 ﾠsee	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠHabitat	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠWild	
 ﾠBirds	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠEnvironmental	
 ﾠImpact	
 ﾠ
Assessment	
 ﾠDirectives.	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
Utility	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠassumed	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠfunction	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual's	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠincome,	
 ﾠyi,	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠservices	
 ﾠderived	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠ(E)	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠ(E0)	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdebit,	
 ﾠL,	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠrepresents	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlost	
 ﾠ
value	
 ﾠassociated	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdecline	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠE	
 ﾠ(I	
 ﾠignore	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtime	
 ﾠdimension	
 ﾠ
here,	
 ﾠsee	
 ﾠSection	
 ﾠ3.2.7).	
 ﾠUnder	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠVEA	
 ﾠapproach,	
 ﾠE	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠE0	
 ﾠneed	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠ
perfect	
 ﾠsubstitutes,	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠassumed	
 ﾠunder	
 ﾠREA/HEA.	
 ﾠ
Equation	
 ﾠ(1)	
 ﾠmakes	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpolluter	
 ﾠpays	
 ﾠ(Polluter	
 ﾠ
Pays	
 ﾠ Principle,	
 ﾠ PPP)	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ victim	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ damage,	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
whose	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠrepresented	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ(1),	
 ﾠdoes	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠexperience	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
income	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠpayment	
 ﾠR.	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠIII	
 ﾠtakes	
 ﾠissues	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠ
this	
 ﾠ"cost-ﾭ‐free	
 ﾠcompensation"	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠsuggests	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠscale	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠR	
 ﾠshould	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠfunction	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual's	
 ﾠopportunity	
 ﾠcosts,	
 ﾠci	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
paying	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensation:	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
 Vi
0(E, E
0,yi) = Vi
1(E - L,
 E
0 + Ri*, yi - ci)                        (2) 
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ A	
 ﾠnumber	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠideas	
 ﾠunderlie	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠconcept	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠimplicit	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠstudy,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠassumes:	
 ﾠ
•  a	
 ﾠ'welfarism'	
 ﾠparadigm,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠassumes	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠall	
 ﾠchanges	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠaffect	
 ﾠ
human	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠevaluated	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠterms	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠutility,	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠsome	
 ﾠtype	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
value	
 ﾠinformation	
 ﾠ(Berrens	
 ﾠ2001).	
 ﾠWelfarism	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠchallenged	
 ﾠmost	
 ﾠ
frequently	
 ﾠ when	
 ﾠ there	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ considerable	
 ﾠ uncertainty	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ measuring	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠeffect	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠsome	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠutility,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcase	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
assessment	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠresources.	
 ﾠ
•  the	
 ﾠlegal	
 ﾠrequirements	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠmotivated	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠ
welfare	
 ﾠ concerns.	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ implication	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ direct	
 ﾠ impact	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
interest	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠsociety's	
 ﾠwelfare,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠitself	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠaffected	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠ
change	
 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠp o i n t 	
 ﾠw h i c h 	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ lost	
 ﾠ when	
 ﾠu s i n g 	
 ﾠn o n -ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ
metrics	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠHEA/REA	
 ﾠ(this	
 ﾠfact	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠmotivated	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtitle	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠ
thesis,	
 ﾠsee	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠII).	
 ﾠ
•  an	
 ﾠexternal	
 ﾠmarket	
 ﾠfailure	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠpresent	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠrequires	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠr e g u l a t i o n s 	
 ﾠ( i n	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ perfectly	
 ﾠ competitive	
 ﾠ market,	
 ﾠ
government	
 ﾠintervention	
 ﾠwould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠsuperfluous).	
 ﾠThat	
 ﾠis,	
 ﾠproducers	
 ﾠ
fail	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠconsider	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfull	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠcosts	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠproduction,	
 ﾠleading	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠoverproduction	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠlosses.	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠkey	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠunderstanding	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcritique	
 ﾠput	
 ﾠforth	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠIII.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
•  a	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠgoods	
 ﾠmarket	
 ﾠfailure	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠpresent	
 ﾠdue	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐divisible	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐excludable	
 ﾠnature	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠmechanism	
 ﾠ(see	
 ﾠ
Paper	
 ﾠIII).	
 ﾠThus,	
 ﾠdistributional	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠunavoidable:	
 ﾠthere	
 ﾠwill	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
be	
 ﾠ 'winners'	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ losers'	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ heterogeneous	
 ﾠ society	
 ﾠ following	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠproject.	
 ﾠ
•  society	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠwilling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠ(substitute)	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ
damaged	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthese	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠpreferences	
 ﾠlie	
 ﾠbehind	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
sought-ﾭ‐after	
 ﾠequivalency	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠlost	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠgained	
 ﾠresources.	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
case	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthreatened	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠrare	
 ﾠhabitats	
 ﾠsubstitutability	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ
reasonable	
 ﾠ assumption,	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ case	
 ﾠ economics	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ less	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ
contribute	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠassessment.8	
 ﾠ
•  compensation	
 ﾠcosts	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠmoney	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠreturns	
 ﾠbenefits	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠterms	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
biodiversity	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ ecosystem	
 ﾠ service	
 ﾠ improvements	
 ﾠ (just	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ
pollution	
 ﾠabatement	
 ﾠdoes	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠair	
 ﾠquality).	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠtype	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
generally	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠacknowledged	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠ(Paper	
 ﾠIII)	
 ﾠ
•  the	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ scaling	
 ﾠ methods	
 ﾠ discussed	
 ﾠ here	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ only	
 ﾠ
applicable	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ case	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ marginal	
 ﾠ changes	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ damaged	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ
restored	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠ(i.e.,	
 ﾠcases	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠspecies	
 ﾠextinction	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠcontamination	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ'last	
 ﾠfew	
 ﾠacres	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwetland'	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠregion	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠsuitable	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠ
scaling	
 ﾠapproach).	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
•  our	
 ﾠ framework	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ deterministic	
 ﾠ approach,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ does	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ
explicitly	
 ﾠtake	
 ﾠinto	
 ﾠaccount	
 ﾠuncertainty	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠrelates	
 ﾠto,	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠ
individual	
 ﾠpreferences	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠoutcomes.	
 ﾠFor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠrather	
 ﾠ
that	
 ﾠexplicitly	
 ﾠaccounting	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠfuture	
 ﾠuncertainty	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠstochastic	
 ﾠ
approach,	
 ﾠ EA	
 ﾠ generally	
 ﾠc o n s i d e r s 	
 ﾠu n c e r t a i n t y 	
 ﾠex	
 ﾠ post	
 ﾠ through	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
sensitivity	
 ﾠanalysis	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠkey	
 ﾠparameters	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdiscount	
 ﾠrate,	
 ﾠ
extent	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠloss,	
 ﾠyears	
 ﾠuntil	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠrecovery,	
 ﾠetc.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠremaining	
 ﾠpart	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠstudy	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠorganized	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠfollows.	
 ﾠSection	
 ﾠ2	
 ﾠ
summarizes	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpurpose	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠobjective	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠstudy.	
 ﾠSection	
 ﾠ3	
 ﾠdescribes	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠissues	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠarise	
 ﾠwhen	
 ﾠmeasuring	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠintroduces	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠmethod.	
 ﾠSection	
 ﾠ4	
 ﾠ
summarizes	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠcontributions	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠpapers	
 ﾠI,	
 ﾠII,	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠIII.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
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8	
 ﾠWhen	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠex	
 ﾠpost	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠalready	
 ﾠoccurred	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
legally	
 ﾠbinding.	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠcase,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlegal	
 ﾠrequirements	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠguide	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠgreater	
 ﾠ
extent	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠpreferences.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
2  Purpose	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠObjective	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠpurpose	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠthesis	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠanalyze	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠimplications	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠ providing	
 ﾠr e s o u r c e -ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠinjuries.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠthesis	
 ﾠfocuses	
 ﾠheavily	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠ
Analysis	
 ﾠ(EA)	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠapproach.	
 ﾠSpecifically,	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠaim	
 ﾠto:	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
 Study	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠimplications	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠusing	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠmetric	
 ﾠ(e.g.,	
 ﾠ
acres	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ habitat,	
 ﾠ number	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ birds,	
 ﾠ etc)	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Habitat	
 ﾠ Equivalency	
 ﾠ
Analysis	
 ﾠ (HEA)	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ Resource	
 ﾠ Equivalency	
 ﾠ Analysis	
 ﾠ (REA).	
 ﾠ See	
 ﾠ
Licentiate	
 ﾠthesis	
 ﾠ(see	
 ﾠCole	
 ﾠ2010.	
 ﾠISBN	
 ﾠ978-ﾭ‐91-ﾭ‐86197-ﾭ‐78-ﾭ‐0)	
 ﾠ
 Develop	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠREA	
 ﾠapplication	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠinterdisciplinary	
 ﾠsetting	
 ﾠtogether	
 ﾠ
with	
 ﾠecologists	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠaddress	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠcontemporary	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠloss:	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠ
power	
 ﾠdevelopment	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠbird	
 ﾠcollisions	
 ﾠ(Paper	
 ﾠI).	
 ﾠ
 Communicate	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠ framework	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ
ecologists	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ order	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ broaden	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ debate	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ
compensation.	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ goal	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ encourage	
 ﾠ more	
 ﾠ interdisciplinary	
 ﾠ
cooperation	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ highlighting	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ issue	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ frequently	
 ﾠ
mischaracterized	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠecologists:	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠour	
 ﾠgoal	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdetermine	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠaffects	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠ(Paper	
 ﾠII).	
 ﾠ
 Criticize	
 ﾠE A ' s 	
 ﾠconventional	
 ﾠ focus	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ equity	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ victims	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠ damage	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ suggesting	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ alternative	
 ﾠ scaling	
 ﾠ
criterion	
 ﾠbased	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠefficiency.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠgoal	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠfocus	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠbroadly	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠ
social	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠconsider	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠbest	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠassess	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠ
trade-ﾭ‐offs	
 ﾠinherent	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ(Paper	
 ﾠIII).	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
3  Economics	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠCompensation	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Welfare	
 ﾠeconomics	
 ﾠstudies	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠimpact	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
policies,	
 ﾠ economic	
 ﾠ activity,	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ other	
 ﾠ changes	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ affect	
 ﾠ human	
 ﾠ
welfare.	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ tools	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ economics	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ help	
 ﾠ us	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ evaluate	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠ payment	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ offset	
 ﾠa n 	
 ﾠi n d i v i d u a l ' s 	
 ﾠu t i l i t y 	
 ﾠl o s s 	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ
discuss	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠimplications	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠaggregating	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠpayment.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Historically,	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ been	
 ﾠ driven	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ ex	
 ﾠ
post	
 ﾠlegal	
 ﾠobligations	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠclean	
 ﾠup	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠrepair	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠde	
 ﾠfacto	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠ
injuries.	
 ﾠThese	
 ﾠex	
 ﾠpost	
 ﾠscenarios	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠUS	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠdriven	
 ﾠprimarily	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
Natural	
 ﾠ Resource	
 ﾠ Damage	
 ﾠ Assessment	
 ﾠ (NRDA)	
 ﾠ regulations,	
 ﾠ while	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ EU	
 ﾠ they	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ driven	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠ Liability	
 ﾠ Directive	
 ﾠ
(Directive	
 ﾠ35/2004;	
 ﾠBrans	
 ﾠ2006).	
 ﾠUnder	
 ﾠboth	
 ﾠEU	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠUS	
 ﾠstatutes	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
key	
 ﾠ component	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ assessment	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ interim	
 ﾠ loss	
 ﾠ
(Figure	
 ﾠ1),	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠsupposed	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠoffset.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠ
interim	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠremains	
 ﾠafter	
 ﾠclean-ﾭ‐up	
 ﾠ
activities	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ damage-ﾭ‐reducing	
 ﾠ measures	
 ﾠ have	
 ﾠ been	
 ﾠ undertaken,	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ
financial	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠmarket	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠbeen	
 ﾠpaid.	
 ﾠ
From	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ economics	
 ﾠ perspective	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ value	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ victim's	
 ﾠ
interim	
 ﾠ loss	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ monetary	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ needed	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ restore	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
individual	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐spill	
 ﾠ level	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ utility	
 ﾠ (Dunford	
 ﾠ et	
 ﾠ al.	
 ﾠ 2004).	
 ﾠ
However,	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ US	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ EU	
 ﾠ statutes	
 ﾠ preclude	
 ﾠ monetary	
 ﾠ payment	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ victims,	
 ﾠ requiring	
 ﾠ instead	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ resource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠ(e.g.,	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠgood).	
 ﾠGiven	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠrestriction	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠmechanism,	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠassessment	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠevolved	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠUS	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠEU	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠfocus	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdirect	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠrequired	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠmake	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
public	
 ﾠwhole	
 ﾠrather	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠmonetary	
 ﾠassessment	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠdamages	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ purpose	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ compensating	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ level	
 ﾠ (Flores	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ
Thacher	
 ﾠ2002).	
 ﾠ	
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3.1  Equivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ(EA)	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠ EA	
 ﾠ method	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ been	
 ﾠ developed	
 ﾠ around	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ concept	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
interim	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvictim.	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠaims	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠ'equivalence'	
 ﾠover	
 ﾠ
time	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠspace	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpresent	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinterim	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠ(debit)	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠ present	
 ﾠ value	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ subsequent	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ gain	
 ﾠ (credit	
 ﾠ ),	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ1.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠinterim	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠfunction	
 ﾠof,	
 ﾠamong	
 ﾠother	
 ﾠthings,	
 ﾠprimary	
 ﾠ
restoration,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ scaled	
 ﾠ using	
 ﾠ biological	
 ﾠ criteria	
 ﾠ aimed	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ
improving	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ recovery	
 ﾠ rate	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ damaged	
 ﾠ resource.	
 ﾠ It	
 ﾠ indirectly	
 ﾠ
affects	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠbecause	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠreduces	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsize	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinterim	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠand,	
 ﾠ
thus,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠpayment.	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠcontrast,	
 ﾠnatural	
 ﾠrecovery	
 ﾠleads	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
an	
 ﾠincrease	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinterim	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠ(all	
 ﾠelse	
 ﾠequal)	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠarea	
 ﾠX	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ1	
 ﾠ
(i.e.,	
 ﾠX	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbenefit	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠprimary	
 ﾠremediation).	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠdebit	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcredit	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠoccur	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠdifferent	
 ﾠlocations	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠdifferent	
 ﾠ
points	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠtime,	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlater	
 ﾠleads	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdiscounting	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠ(Section	
 ﾠ
3.2.7).	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdebit/credit	
 ﾠ(Y	
 ﾠaxis)	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠmeasured	
 ﾠrelative	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
pre-ﾭ‐damage	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐restoration	
 ﾠ level	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ
captured	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ monetary	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ terms	
 ﾠ (Section	
 ﾠ 3.2.2),	
 ﾠ i.e.,	
 ﾠ
equivalency	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠproceed	
 ﾠunder	
 ﾠtwo	
 ﾠassumptions:	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
•  A	
 ﾠValue	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ(VEA)	
 ﾠmeasures	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠ
loss	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠgain	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠterms	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠits	
 ﾠaffect	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠindividual's	
 ﾠutility.	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠ
utility	
 ﾠ change	
 ﾠ could	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ measured	
 ﾠ using	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ monetary	
 ﾠ measure	
 ﾠ
(Parson	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠKang	
 ﾠ2010)	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠcould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠassessed	
 ﾠusing	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠquantity	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
a	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠgained	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠlost	
 ﾠ(Breffle	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠRowe	
 ﾠ2002).	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
former	
 ﾠcase,	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmonetary	
 ﾠsum	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠattached	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠgain	
 ﾠusing	
 ﾠ
economic	
 ﾠvaluation	
 ﾠtechniques	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠscaled	
 ﾠbased	
 ﾠ
on	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ information.	
 ﾠ Note	
 ﾠ further	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ describes	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ value-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐
value	
 ﾠ variant	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ VEA,	
 ﾠ but	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ cost-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐value	
 ﾠ approach,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ
frequently	
 ﾠused	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcases	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠrecreational	
 ﾠlosses,	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠscale	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠits	
 ﾠcost	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠset	
 ﾠequal	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlost	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠ
in	
 ﾠmonetary	
 ﾠterms.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
•  	
 ﾠAn	
 ﾠREA	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠHEA	
 ﾠmeasures	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠgain	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠ
welfare	
 ﾠusing	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ(ecological)	
 ﾠmetric	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠacres	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
habitat	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠnumber	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠspecies.	
 ﾠ Rather	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠassigning	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmonetary	
 ﾠ
sum	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpublic's	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠgain,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ
metric	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ proxy	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ change	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ human	
 ﾠ welfare.	
 ﾠT h e s e 	
 ﾠ
approaches	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ sometimes	
 ﾠ referred	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ "resource-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐resource"	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ
"service-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐service"	
 ﾠscaling.	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Figure 1. The debit and credit in Equivalency Analysis (EA) scaling 
 
	
 ﾠ
3.2  Measuring	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ
A	
 ﾠnumber	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠissues	
 ﾠarise	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠinterdisciplinary	
 ﾠ
damage	
 ﾠassessment	
 ﾠaimed	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ
payment.	
 ﾠEach	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsubsections	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠfollow	
 ﾠdescribe	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠthese	
 ﾠissues	
 ﾠ
arise	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ identify	
 ﾠ when	
 ﾠ EA	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ deviate	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ welfare-ﾭ‐theoretic	
 ﾠ
approach.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
•  (Section	
 ﾠ3.2.1)	
 ﾠ A	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠ
•  (Section	
 ﾠ3.2.2)	
 ﾠ A	
 ﾠcurrency	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠvaluing	
 ﾠtrades	
 ﾠ
•  (Section	
 ﾠ3.2.3)	
 ﾠ Sufficient	
 ﾠscale	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ
•  (Section	
 ﾠ3.2.4)	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠmechanism	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
•  (Section	
 ﾠ3.2.5)	
 ﾠ Aggregating	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠpreferences	
 ﾠ
•  (Section	
 ﾠ3.2.6)	
 ﾠ Who	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠpaying	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠwho	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvictim?	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ
•  (Section	
 ﾠ3.2.7)	
 ﾠ Accounting	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠtime:	
 ﾠdiscounting	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
3.2.1  A	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠbasic	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠchoose	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠconsume	
 ﾠgoods	
 ﾠ
(private	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ public)	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ maximize	
 ﾠ their	
 ﾠ utility,	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ unobservable	
 ﾠ
measure	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ well-ﾭ‐being.	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ question	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ how	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ compensate	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 20	
 ﾠ
individual	
 ﾠwhen	
 ﾠhe/she	
 ﾠcannot	
 ﾠconsume	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠgood	
 ﾠdue	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠdamage.9	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠindifference	
 ﾠcurve	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ2	
 ﾠmeasures	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠpreferences	
 ﾠ
between	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠamount	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠprivate	
 ﾠ(X)	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠgoods	
 ﾠ(Q),	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠparticular	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠcombinations	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠX	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠQ	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠindifferent	
 ﾠi.e.,	
 ﾠ
(Q1,	
 ﾠX1)	
 ﾠprovides	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsame	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠ(Q2,	
 ﾠX2)	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠhe	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠbetter	
 ﾠoff	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠ
(Q3,X3).10	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠkey	
 ﾠpoint	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠhe	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠeasily	
 ﾠsubstitute	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠother	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠstill	
 ﾠmaintain	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsame	
 ﾠlevel	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠrepresented	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠ
U1	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠU2.	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠimplies	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠhe	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠcompensated	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠ
good	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠprovision	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠalternative	
 ﾠgood,	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠrelevant	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐
off	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠcase	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠrestored,	
 ﾠre-ﾭ‐habilitated,	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠ
replaced	
 ﾠresource.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Moving	
 ﾠnortheast	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ2	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠpreferred	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠreceives	
 ﾠ
more	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠboth,	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠmovements	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠconstrained	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠbudgets	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠother	
 ﾠ
restrictions.	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠother	
 ﾠwords,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠcannot	
 ﾠ"get	
 ﾠsomething	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠ
nothing"	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠmust	
 ﾠtrade	
 ﾠless	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠthing	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠorder	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠreceive	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
another,	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠunderlying	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcritique	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠIII.	
 ﾠ
However	
 ﾠsimple	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠassumptions	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠsubstitutability	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐offs,	
 ﾠ
these	
 ﾠconcepts	
 ﾠunderlie	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠmajority	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠmodels	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠestimate	
 ﾠ
individual	
 ﾠchoice	
 ﾠ(Freeman	
 ﾠIII	
 ﾠ2003a)	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠparticularly	
 ﾠimportant	
 ﾠ
in	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcontext	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠcompensation.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
9	
 ﾠEnvironmental	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠfocuses	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠinjury,	
 ﾠ
exclusive	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠprofit	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠ(e.g.,	
 ﾠproducer	
 ﾠsurplus).	
 ﾠLoss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠprofits	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbusinesses	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠrely	
 ﾠ
on	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ service	
 ﾠ (e.g.,	
 ﾠ fishing	
 ﾠ tourism	
 ﾠ impacted	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ chemical	
 ﾠ spill)	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ
addressed	
 ﾠthrough	
 ﾠalternative	
 ﾠlegal	
 ﾠchannels	
 ﾠ(e.g.,	
 ﾠtort	
 ﾠlaw).	
 ﾠ
10	
 ﾠA s 	
 ﾠd r a w n 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠcurves	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ each	
 ﾠ axis	
 ﾠ without	
 ﾠ touching,	
 ﾠ indicating	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ
substitution	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠalways	
 ﾠpossible.	
 ﾠIf	
 ﾠU2	
 ﾠbecame	
 ﾠstrictly	
 ﾠvertical	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠQ2	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠwould	
 ﾠindicate	
 ﾠ
that	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠno	
 ﾠlonger	
 ﾠwilling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠtrade	
 ﾠless	
 ﾠQ	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠX,	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠperhaps	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠ
endangered	
 ﾠ species.	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ implies	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ both	
 ﾠ goods	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ assumed	
 ﾠ "essential"	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ
implies	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ cannot	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ compensated	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ complete	
 ﾠ loss	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ either	
 ﾠ
resource.	
 ﾠ	
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Figure	
 ﾠ2	
 ﾠIndividual	
 ﾠindifference	
 ﾠcurves	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
3.2.2  A	
 ﾠcurrency	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠvaluing	
 ﾠtrades	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Because	
 ﾠindividuals'	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠchanges	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠobservable,	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠindirect	
 ﾠ
proxy	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ measure	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ required.	
 ﾠ At	
 ﾠ least	
 ﾠ two	
 ﾠ measures	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ
possible:	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠm o n e t a r y 	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠn o n -ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ currency	
 ﾠ( n u m e r a i r e ) 	
 ﾠf o r 	
 ﾠ
valuing	
 ﾠtrades	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠresources.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
A	
 ﾠfrequently	
 ﾠused	
 ﾠcurrency	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠcontext	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠmoney.11	
 ﾠThat	
 ﾠis,	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠ
could	
 ﾠask	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠsuffering	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠQ 0	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐>	
 ﾠQ1	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ3,	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠ
much	
 ﾠhe	
 ﾠwould	
 ﾠdemand	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠreturn	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐damaged	
 ﾠlevel	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐
being	
 ﾠ(represented	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠU2).	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠcalled	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensating	
 ﾠvariation,	
 ﾠ
CV	
 ﾠ(see	
 ﾠSection	
 ﾠ3.2.3)	
 ﾠCV	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvertical	
 ﾠdistance	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠY	
 ﾠaxis	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
'good'	
 ﾠprovided	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠlieu	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdesired	
 ﾠgood	
 ﾠ(Q).	
 ﾠCV	
 ﾠcould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠmeasured	
 ﾠ
in	
 ﾠ terms	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ private	
 ﾠ good,	
 ﾠ X,	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ money,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ purchase	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠO f 	
 ﾠc o u r s e 	
 ﾠa lternative	
 ﾠ currencies	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ numeraires	
 ﾠ could	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ used,	
 ﾠ but	
 ﾠ money	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ
convenient	
 ﾠbecause	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠdivisible.	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
private	
 ﾠgood.	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠVEA	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠuse	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmonetary	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠcurrency,	
 ﾠthough	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠ
need	
 ﾠnot.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ 3	
 ﾠC o m p e n s a t i n g 	
 ﾠa n 	
 ﾠi n d i v i d u a l 	
 ﾠf o r 	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠr e d u c t i o n 	
 ﾠi n 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠn o n -ﾭ‐market	
 ﾠ public	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠgood,	
 ﾠQ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ motivated	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ notion	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ money	
 ﾠ measures	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ utility	
 ﾠ
changes	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠobjectionable	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠtoo	
 ﾠdifficult	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠestimate	
 ﾠ(Unsworth	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
Bishop	
 ﾠ1994).	
 ﾠThus	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠalternative	
 ﾠcurrency	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpurpose	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠpaying	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠuse	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠmetric	
 ﾠ
that	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ common	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ both	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ debit	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ credit	
 ﾠ (e.g.,	
 ﾠ acres	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ habitat,	
 ﾠ
number	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ birds).	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ necessarily	
 ﾠ involves	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ number	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ strong	
 ﾠ
assumptions	
 ﾠ(Dunford	
 ﾠet	
 ﾠal	
 ﾠ2004).	
 ﾠFirst,	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠmetric	
 ﾠfully	
 ﾠ
captures	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcomplex	
 ﾠchanges	
 ﾠoccurring	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠ
ecosystem.12	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠSecond,	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠwe	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠproxy	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠchanges	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠ
ecological	
 ﾠ metric.	
 ﾠ Relying	
 ﾠ directly	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ ecological	
 ﾠ change	
 ﾠ (as	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ
HEA/REA)	
 ﾠrather	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠfiltering	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠeffect	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠthrough	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠ
indifference	
 ﾠ curve	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ reflects	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ individual's	
 ﾠ preferences	
 ﾠ runs	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
risk	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ wrongly	
 ﾠ assuming	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ linear	
 ﾠ approximation	
 ﾠ over	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ entire	
 ﾠ
interval	
 ﾠ (e.g.	
 ﾠ restoration	
 ﾠ project).	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ problem	
 ﾠ when	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
12	
 ﾠPeterson	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠLipcius	
 ﾠ(2003)	
 ﾠidentify	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠprogress	
 ﾠrequired	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠimprove	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠuse	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
ecological	
 ﾠmetrics	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠrestoration.	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
evaluating	
 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐marginal	
 ﾠ projects.13	
 ﾠT h i r d , 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠa p p r o a c h 	
 ﾠa s s u m e s 	
 ﾠ
constant	
 ﾠ real	
 ﾠ value	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ resources	
 ﾠ over	
 ﾠ time	
 ﾠ (Unsworth	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ Bishop	
 ﾠ
1994).	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠhold	
 ﾠunder	
 ﾠvarious	
 ﾠassumptions	
 ﾠe.g.,	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠbecomes	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠless	
 ﾠscarce	
 ﾠover	
 ﾠtime.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Thus,	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ economics	
 ﾠ suggests	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ currency	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠtraded	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠvalued	
 ﾠcould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠbased	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠobservable	
 ﾠ
monetary	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠmeasures	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠchanges.	
 ﾠ
3.2.3  Sufficient	
 ﾠscale	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ 3	
 ﾠi l l u s t r a t e s 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠsufficient	
 ﾠ quantity	
 ﾠ (scale)	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠ payment,	
 ﾠ using	
 ﾠ both	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ monetary	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ
measure	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠutility.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠpayment	
 ﾠassumes	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinitial	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠlevel	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
constant	
 ﾠ (U2)	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ associated	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ status	
 ﾠ quo	
 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠr i g h t 	
 ﾠt o 	
 ﾠa n 	
 ﾠ
uncontaminated	
 ﾠ environment	
 ﾠ (Q0).	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ scaled	
 ﾠ payment	
 ﾠ must	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ
sufficient	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠindifferent	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinitial	
 ﾠclean	
 ﾠ
environment	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ contaminated	
 ﾠ one,	
 ﾠ given	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ reduction	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Q	
 ﾠf r o m 	
 ﾠ
point	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠpoint	
 ﾠB	
 ﾠ(Q0	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐>Q1).	
 ﾠ
In	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcase	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensating	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
point	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcomparison	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐loss	
 ﾠlevel	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠwillingness	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠaccept	
 ﾠcompensation,	
 ﾠi.e.,	
 ﾠCompensating	
 ﾠVariation	
 ﾠ(CV)	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcorrect	
 ﾠ
welfare	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠ(Freeman	
 ﾠ2003).	
 ﾠCV	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠsufficient	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠoffset	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinterim	
 ﾠ
loss	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Figure	
 ﾠ 1	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠt h u s 	
 ﾠr e p r e s e n t s 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠc o r r e c t 	
 ﾠm a g n i t u d e 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠ restoration14	
 ﾠa s 	
 ﾠd e s c r i b e d 	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ Section	
 ﾠ 3.2.3	
 ﾠ CV	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ
estimated	
 ﾠusing	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠvaluation,	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠasked	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
state	
 ﾠtheir	
 ﾠwillingness	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠaccept	
 ﾠcompensation.	
 ﾠUsing	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdefinitions	
 ﾠ
from	
 ﾠ equation	
 ﾠ (1),	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ represented	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ (Unsworth	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ Bishop	
 ﾠ
1994;	
 ﾠFlores	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠThacher	
 ﾠ2002;	
 ﾠRoach	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠWade	
 ﾠ2006):	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ u1
0(E,E
0,yi) = ui
1(E - L, E
0, yi + CVi) 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ (2)	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠfully	
 ﾠcompensated	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpayment	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠCVi	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠIf	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐marginal	
 ﾠ(i.e.,	
 ﾠcovering	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠsignificantly	
 ﾠlarge	
 ﾠinterval	
 ﾠ),	
 ﾠthen	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠlinear	
 ﾠ
approximation	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠpreferences	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠparticularly	
 ﾠquestionable.	
 ﾠSuch	
 ﾠprojects	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠstill	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠ
assessed	
 ﾠ based	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ preferences,	
 ﾠ but	
 ﾠ generally	
 ﾠ require	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ more	
 ﾠ sophisticated	
 ﾠ
model	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdetermine	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠpreferences	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠacross	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinterval.	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠspecific	
 ﾠexample	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
this	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠBreffle	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠRowe	
 ﾠ(2002)	
 ﾠwho	
 ﾠask	
 ﾠrespondents	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠchoice	
 ﾠexperiment	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠ
both	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠgain	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠwhole.	
 ﾠ
14	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠassumes	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠenvironment	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠreturned	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbaseline.	
 ﾠIf	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠdoes	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠ(i.e.,	
 ﾠ
long	
 ﾠ term	
 ﾠ damage),	
 ﾠ complementary	
 ﾠ restoration	
 ﾠ would	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ needed	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ addition	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠrestoration.	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ payment	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ also	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ based	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ measure	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
utility	
 ﾠa l o n g 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠX 	
 ﾠa x i s , 	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠ sufficient	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠn e c e s s a r i l y 	
 ﾠ
greater	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠQr	
 ﾠshown	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ3,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠdepicts	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠscenario	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
damaged	
 ﾠenvironment	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠimmediately	
 ﾠ“given	
 ﾠback”	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual.	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠ
reality	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdebit	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcredit	
 ﾠaccrue	
 ﾠover	
 ﾠlong	
 ﾠtime	
 ﾠperiods	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthus	
 ﾠQr	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
insufficient	
 ﾠbecause	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠdoes	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠaccount	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠfull	
 ﾠinterim	
 ﾠloss.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠ sufficient	
 ﾠ scale	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ i,	
 ﾠ Ri,	
 ﾠc a n 	
 ﾠb e 	
 ﾠ
estimated	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠasking	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠstate	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠamount	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠ(a	
 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠmetric)	
 ﾠthey	
 ﾠwould	
 ﾠrequire	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠensure	
 ﾠ
they	
 ﾠremain	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠtheir	
 ﾠoriginal	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠlevel	
 ﾠ(Examples	
 ﾠinclude	
 ﾠBreffle	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
Rowe	
 ﾠ2002;	
 ﾠMolowny-ﾭ‐Horas	
 ﾠet	
 ﾠal	
 ﾠ2008).	
 ﾠAssuming	
 ﾠV0	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindirect	
 ﾠ
utility	
 ﾠprior	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠV1	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐damage,	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠrepresented	
 ﾠas:	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ V0(E,E
0,yi) = u1(E- L, E
0 + Ri, yi)  	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ (3)	
 ﾠ
Therefore,	
 ﾠ Ri	
 ﾠi s 	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ appropriate	
 ﾠ measure	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ
restoration	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamage.	
 ﾠNote,	
 ﾠhowever,	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠR i	
 ﾠcannot	
 ﾠ
be	
 ﾠ divided	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ exclusively	
 ﾠ provided	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ each	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ
implications	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠaggregation	
 ﾠ(see	
 ﾠSections	
 ﾠ3.2.5	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ3.2.6)	
 ﾠ
Table	
 ﾠ2	
 ﾠsummarizes	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdifferences	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠboth	
 ﾠindirect	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠmeasures	
 ﾠ
for	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠloss.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
Table	
 ﾠ2	
 ﾠComparison	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensating	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠmeasures	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠ
Compensating	
 ﾠ
measure	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Basis	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐
being	
 ﾠ
measurement	
 ﾠ
Method	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠ
obtaining	
 ﾠ
measure	
 ﾠ
Stated	
 ﾠPreference	
 ﾠscenario	
 ﾠ
CV	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ(Y	
 ﾠaxis	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ5)	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
[	
 ﾠsee	
 ﾠformula	
 ﾠ(1)	
 ﾠ]	
 ﾠ
utility	
 ﾠ Stated	
 ﾠ
preference	
 ﾠ
survey	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠ
monetary	
 ﾠ
metric	
 ﾠ
How	
 ﾠmuch	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ
would	
 ﾠyou	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠwilling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
accept	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠterms	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠmoney	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
return	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠoriginal	
 ﾠ(pre-ﾭ‐
damage)	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠlevel?	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠR	
 ﾠ>	
 ﾠQr	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ(X	
 ﾠaxis	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ5)	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
utility	
 ﾠ Stated	
 ﾠ
preference	
 ﾠ
survey	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠ
monetary	
 ﾠ
metric	
 ﾠ
How	
 ﾠmuch	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ
would	
 ﾠyou	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠwilling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
accept	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠterms	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠreturn	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠoriginal	
 ﾠ
(pre-ﾭ‐damage)	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠlevel?a	
 ﾠ
a	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠHEA/REA	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠobviates	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠneed	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠstated	
 ﾠpreference	
 ﾠsurvey	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
instead	
 ﾠassumes	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠwilling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠ
with	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠproportion	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠmetric.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
3.2.4  The	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠmechanism	
 ﾠ
Although	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ impacts	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ
payment	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ valued	
 ﾠ using	
 ﾠi n 	
 ﾠm o n e y 	
 ﾠ( C V ) 	
 ﾠo r 	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ
measures	
 ﾠ(R),	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠactual	
 ﾠprovision	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠrestricted	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ
resource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠproject,	
 ﾠi.e.,	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠgood.	
 ﾠFor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠELD	
 ﾠnotes	
 ﾠ
that	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠinterim	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠ"	
 ﾠ...	
 ﾠdoes	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠconsist	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠfinancial	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
members	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpublic"	
 ﾠ(ELD	
 ﾠAnnex	
 ﾠII	
 ﾠ1(d);	
 ﾠsee	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠRandall	
 ﾠ1997).	
 ﾠ
In	
 ﾠ theory	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ least,	
 ﾠ alternative	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ mechanisms	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ
possible,	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠwilling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠconsumption	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠ
good	
 ﾠf o r 	
 ﾠa n o t h e r . 	
 ﾠLazaro-ﾭ‐Touza	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ Atkinson	
 ﾠ (2009)	
 ﾠ conducted	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
survey	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ assess	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ willingness	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ individuals	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠ damage	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ oil	
 ﾠ spill	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ three	
 ﾠ types	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ
improvements:	
 ﾠ(1)	
 ﾠman-ﾭ‐made	
 ﾠcapital	
 ﾠinfrastructure	
 ﾠ(roads),	
 ﾠ(2)	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠ
capital	
 ﾠ (schools,	
 ﾠ hospitals),	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ (3)	
 ﾠ natural	
 ﾠ capital	
 ﾠ (environmental	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠprojects).	
 ﾠThey	
 ﾠfound	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠpreferred	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠ
capital	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠnatural	
 ﾠcapital	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠalmost	
 ﾠ2	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ1	
 ﾠratio	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠcompensate	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠoil	
 ﾠ
damage	
 ﾠ( t h e s e 	
 ﾠc o m p e n s a t o r y 	
 ﾠa l t e r n a t i v e s 	
 ﾠa l s o	
 ﾠ represent	
 ﾠ public	
 ﾠ
goods).	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ authors	
 ﾠ suggest	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ supports	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠs p e c u l a t i o n s 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠ
Turner	
 ﾠ (2007)	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ money	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ compensate	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ certain	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠlosses.15	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Welfare	
 ﾠ economics	
 ﾠ suggests	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ money	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ convenient	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠmechanism	
 ﾠbecause,	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠtheory,	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠdivisible	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠ
provided	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ different	
 ﾠ amounts	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ different	
 ﾠ individuals	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ exactly	
 ﾠ
compensate	
 ﾠtheir	
 ﾠloss.	
 ﾠFlores	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠThatcher	
 ﾠ(2002)	
 ﾠargue	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠmoney	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ only	
 ﾠ theoretically	
 ﾠ pure	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ mechanism	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠ damage.16	
 ﾠF o r 	
 ﾠe x a m ple,	
 ﾠ following	
 ﾠ contamination	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
popular	
 ﾠsports	
 ﾠfishing	
 ﾠlake,	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠfishermen	
 ﾠcould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠprovided	
 ﾠmonetary	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ offset	
 ﾠ his/her	
 ﾠ presumably	
 ﾠ larger	
 ﾠ utility	
 ﾠ loss,	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ
compared	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐fishermen.	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ case	
 ﾠ when	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠmechanism	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐rival	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐exclusive	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠgood	
 ﾠ
because	
 ﾠ"...	
 ﾠno	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠexcluded	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbenefits	
 ﾠ[of	
 ﾠconsumption]	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠadditional	
 ﾠconsumers	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠuse	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠvirtually	
 ﾠzero	
 ﾠmarginal	
 ﾠcosts"	
 ﾠ
(Johansson	
 ﾠ 1991,	
 ﾠ p.	
 ﾠ 63-ﾭ‐64).	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ implication	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠcannot	
 ﾠcompensate	
 ﾠevery	
 ﾠindividual,	
 ﾠi.e.,	
 ﾠthere	
 ﾠwill	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠ
winners	
 ﾠ (e.g.,	
 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐fishermen)	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ losers	
 ﾠ (fishermen).	
 ﾠ Unless	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠIn	
 ﾠtheory	
 ﾠwe	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠalways	
 ﾠcompensate	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠlong	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠtheir	
 ﾠindifference	
 ﾠcurve	
 ﾠ
intersects	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠappropriate	
 ﾠaxis/dimension.	
 ﾠHowever,	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ(in	
 ﾠany	
 ﾠform)	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
impossible	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcomplete	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠessential	
 ﾠgood,	
 ﾠi.e.,	
 ﾠgoods	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠnever	
 ﾠintersect	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠaxis.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
16	
 ﾠNote	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠessentially	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠacademic	
 ﾠpoint	
 ﾠdue	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlegal	
 ﾠrestriction.	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
preferences	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠhomogenous	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠonly	
 ﾠ
be	
 ﾠprovided	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠaggregate	
 ﾠlevel	
 ﾠ(Jones	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠPease	
 ﾠ1997).	
 ﾠ
3.2.5  Aggregating	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠpreferences	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
Assessing	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠrequires	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠup	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	
 ﾠ
analysis.	
 ﾠ In	
 ﾠ general	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ requires	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ number	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ unavoidable	
 ﾠ value	
 ﾠ
judgments	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠweight	
 ﾠassigned	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdifferent	
 ﾠpeople's	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being.	
 ﾠ
In	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ case	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠr e s o u r c e -ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠm e c h a n i s m s ,	
 ﾠ
aggregation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠfurther	
 ﾠcomplicated	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinevitable	
 ﾠwinners	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠlosers	
 ﾠ
in	
 ﾠsociety.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠquestion	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdetermine	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠeffect	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠ
welfare	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthese	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠwinners	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠlosers?	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠgoal	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠdetermine	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠquadrant	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠreaches	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ4,	
 ﾠ
following	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠsubsequent	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠproject.	
 ﾠIt	
 ﾠillustrates	
 ﾠ
how	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ'social	
 ﾠplanner'	
 ﾠmight	
 ﾠconsider	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠ
two	
 ﾠ households	
 ﾠ (HH1	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠH H 2)	
 ﾠw h e n 	
 ﾠd e c i ding	
 ﾠ whether	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ proceed	
 ﾠ
with	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠe.g.,	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠproject,	
 ﾠgiven	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠinitial	
 ﾠstate	
 ﾠA.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ4	
 ﾠAlternative	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠstates,	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠoutcomes,	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠproposed	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠaction	
 ﾠ(based	
 ﾠ
on	
 ﾠJohansson	
 ﾠ(1991),	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ2.1).	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠPareto	
 ﾠprinciple	
 ﾠsuggests	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠprojects	
 ﾠshould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠundertaken	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠ
long	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠnobody	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠmade	
 ﾠworse	
 ﾠoff	
 ﾠ(i.e.,	
 ﾠonly	
 ﾠnortheast-ﾭ‐moving	
 ﾠprojects).	
 ﾠ
But	
 ﾠ such	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ criteria	
 ﾠ cannot	
 ﾠ handle	
 ﾠ cases	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ winners	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ losers	
 ﾠ
(northwest	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠsoutheast).	
 ﾠAn	
 ﾠalternative	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠcriteria	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
based	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ Kaldor-ﾭ‐Hicks,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ suggests	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ project	
 ﾠ should	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ
undertaken	
 ﾠso	
 ﾠlong	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwinners	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠhypothetically	
 ﾠ'compensate'	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
losers	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠeverybody	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠstill	
 ﾠbetter	
 ﾠoff.	
 ﾠ'Compensate'	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠcase	
 ﾠrefers	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ redistribution	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ (presumably	
 ﾠ inequitable)	
 ﾠ allocation	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
income.	
 ﾠ It	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ less	
 ﾠ than	
 ﾠ ideal	
 ﾠ criteria	
 ﾠ because	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ makes	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ priori	
 ﾠ
assumption	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ utility	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ each	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ society	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ valued	
 ﾠ
evenly	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠmargin	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ(i.e.,	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠcannot	
 ﾠcompare	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠmuch	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlosers	
 ﾠ'lose'	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠmuch	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwinners	
 ﾠ'win,'	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠorder	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdecide	
 ﾠwhether	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠ
has	
 ﾠn e t 	
 ﾠs o c i a l 	
 ﾠb e n e f i t s ) .	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ due	
 ﾠp r i m a r i l y 	
 ﾠt o 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠf a c t 	
 ﾠt h a t 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠprinciple	
 ﾠassumes	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠoptimal,	
 ﾠi.e.,	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
social	
 ﾠ marginal	
 ﾠ value	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ additional	
 ﾠ dollar	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ independent	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
individual.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
A	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠideal,	
 ﾠthough	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠso	
 ﾠpractical,	
 ﾠcriterion	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠrely	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠSocial	
 ﾠ
Welfare	
 ﾠ Function	
 ﾠ (SWF)	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ provides	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠc o m p l e t e 	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠc o n s i s t e n t 	
 ﾠ
ranking	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠprojects.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠshape	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcurves	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ5	
 ﾠimplicitly	
 ﾠ
evaluates	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠHH1	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠHH2.	
 ﾠFor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠ
a	
 ﾠrestoration	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠstands	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbenefit	
 ﾠHH1	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠgreater	
 ﾠextent	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠHH2,	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ planner	
 ﾠ could	
 ﾠ simply	
 ﾠ consult	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ relevant	
 ﾠ SWF,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ
identifies	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠweights	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠhouseholds,	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
then	
 ﾠdecide	
 ﾠwhether	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠresults	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠbenefits	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠnot.	
 ﾠ
Inevitably,	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ requires	
 ﾠ normative	
 ﾠ input	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ society's	
 ﾠ decision-ﾭ‐
makers.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠconventional	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠavoid	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdiscussion	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠweights	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠ relying	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ assumption	
 ﾠ inherent	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Kaldor-ﾭ‐Hicks:	
 ﾠ each	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ
every	
 ﾠperson's	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠvalued	
 ﾠequally,	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠshown	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠSWF 1	
 ﾠ(even	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
decision	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ each	
 ﾠ household's	
 ﾠ utility	
 ﾠ change	
 ﾠ should	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ weighted	
 ﾠ
equally	
 ﾠinvolves	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠethical	
 ﾠjudgment).	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ5	
 ﾠAlternative	
 ﾠSocial	
 ﾠWelfare	
 ﾠFunctions	
 ﾠ(SWF)	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
SWF1	
 ﾠrepresents	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠegalitarian	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠutilitarian	
 ﾠshape,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠmost	
 ﾠcommonly	
 ﾠassumed	
 ﾠ
(though	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠnecessary)	
 ﾠform	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠpractical	
 ﾠapplication	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠslope	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ1.	
 ﾠ
SWF2	
 ﾠrepresents	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠprogressive	
 ﾠform,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠweights	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ"utility	
 ﾠpoor"	
 ﾠ
higher	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ"utility	
 ﾠrich."	
 ﾠFinally,	
 ﾠSWF3	
 ﾠrepresents	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠRawlsian	
 ﾠ
form	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠargues	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠfunction	
 ﾠonly	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠworst	
 ﾠoff	
 ﾠ
households	
 ﾠ(i.e.,	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠgains	
 ﾠnothing	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠprojects	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠincrease	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwell-ﾭ
off).	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ6	
 ﾠillustrates	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠversion	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ2,	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠsocietal	
 ﾠlevel.	
 ﾠ
This	
 ﾠ diagram	
 ﾠ demonstrates	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠ implicit	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠcompensation,	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠscaled	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠEA:	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠX-ﾭ‐axis	
 ﾠrepresents	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠ(Q2)	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠY-ﾭ‐axis	
 ﾠrepresents	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ restored	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ (Q1).	
 ﾠ Equivalency	
 ﾠ analysis	
 ﾠ
assumes	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ society	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ whole	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ willing	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ damaged	
 ﾠ
environment	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠenvironment	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠnecessarily	
 ﾠimplies	
 ﾠ
winners	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ losers.	
 ﾠ Figure	
 ﾠ 6	
 ﾠa s s u m e s 	
 ﾠt h a t 	
 ﾠp r e f e r e n c e s 	
 ﾠh a v e 	
 ﾠb e e n 	
 ﾠ
aggregated	
 ﾠ based	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ some	
 ﾠ criteria	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ ethical	
 ﾠ judgment,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ
allowed	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠmade.	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ5	
 ﾠ
represents	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdiscussion	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠmake	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠaggregation	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfirst	
 ﾠ
place.	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Figure	
 ﾠ6	
 ﾠSocial	
 ﾠindifference	
 ﾠcurves	
 ﾠunderlying	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ(EA)	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
Thus,	
 ﾠp o s i t i v e 	
 ﾠe c o n o m i c 	
 ﾠa n a l y s i s 	
 ﾠp r e c l u d e s 	
 ﾠg u i d a n c e 	
 ﾠo n 	
 ﾠh o w 	
 ﾠt o 	
 ﾠ
determine	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠeffect	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensation.	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠtrue	
 ﾠeven	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ mechanism	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ money,	
 ﾠ but	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ particularly	
 ﾠ
challenging	
 ﾠwhen	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠgood	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠinvolved	
 ﾠbecause	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠ
only	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠprovided	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠsocietal	
 ﾠ(not	
 ﾠindividual)	
 ﾠlevel.	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠshort,	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠ
welfare	
 ﾠinvolves	
 ﾠethical	
 ﾠjudgments,	
 ﾠeither	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠestablishing	
 ﾠweights	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ value	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ individuals'	
 ﾠ utility	
 ﾠ changes	
 ﾠ (as	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ
function17),	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ implicitly	
 ﾠ assuming	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠi n d i v i d u a l s'	
 ﾠ utilities	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ
equally	
 ﾠvalued,	
 ﾠthus	
 ﾠallowing	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠapplication	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠKaldor-ﾭ‐Hicks	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠprinciple.	
 ﾠ
3.2.6  Who	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠpaying	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠwho	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvictim?	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Note	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠequation	
 ﾠ(1)	
 ﾠimplicitly	
 ﾠassumes	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpolluter	
 ﾠpays	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
individual	
 ﾠ i's	
 ﾠu tility	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ no	
 ﾠ way	
 ﾠ affected	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ
payment.	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠI f 	
 ﾠt h i s 	
 ﾠi s 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠc a s e , 	
 ﾠt h e n 	
 ﾠV E A 	
 ﾠr e p r e s e n t s 	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠd e f e n s i b l e 	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠ
welfare-ﾭ‐theoretic	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ scaling	
 ﾠ resource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠ payments	
 ﾠ (as	
 ﾠ
noted	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSection	
 ﾠ3.3	
 ﾠHEA/REA	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠother	
 ﾠshort	
 ﾠcomings).	
 ﾠ
But	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠhold	
 ﾠunder	
 ﾠvarious	
 ﾠscenarios	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠ
(1)	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ i	
 ﾠ owns	
 ﾠ capital	
 ﾠ invested	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ polluting	
 ﾠ firm;	
 ﾠ (2)	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ Kanninen	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ Kriström	
 ﾠ (1993)	
 ﾠ showed	
 ﾠ how	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ results	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠC B A 	
 ﾠm a y 	
 ﾠc h a n g e 	
 ﾠ
depending	
 ﾠupon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠslope	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠassumed	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠfunction.	
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 ﾠ
individual	
 ﾠi	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠtaxpayer	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠscenario	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠgovernment	
 ﾠpays	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠ
part	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ clean	
 ﾠ up	
 ﾠ costs;	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ (3)	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ i	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
consumer	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠproduct	
 ﾠproduced	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmonopolistic	
 ﾠpolluter,	
 ﾠi.e.,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
firm	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠprice	
 ﾠtaker	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠtherefore	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠexert	
 ﾠinfluence	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠprices	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
consumer	
 ﾠ pays	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ response	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ government's	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ
requirement.	
 ﾠ In	
 ﾠ short,	
 ﾠ equation	
 ﾠ (1)	
 ﾠ does	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ account	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
opportunity	
 ﾠcost	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensating	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamage,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠ
be	
 ﾠso	
 ﾠhigh	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠindividual's	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠfall,	
 ﾠthus	
 ﾠinvalidating	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
equality.	
 ﾠ Even	
 ﾠ if	
 ﾠ none	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ above	
 ﾠ scenarios	
 ﾠ hold	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ specific	
 ﾠ
individual,	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ damages	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ monetary	
 ﾠ terms	
 ﾠ collected	
 ﾠ
from	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ polluter	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ public's	
 ﾠ behalf	
 ﾠ represents	
 ﾠ scarce	
 ﾠ societal	
 ﾠ
resources	
 ﾠwhich,	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠcould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠargued,	
 ﾠshould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠsubject	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠtest	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠ
efficiency.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
This	
 ﾠraises	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠquestion	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwhether	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠgeneral	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠframework	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ(1)	
 ﾠ
is	
 ﾠ satisfactory	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ perspective.	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ examine	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ
assertion	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠIII.	
 ﾠ
3.2.7  Accounting	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠtime:	
 ﾠdiscounting	
 ﾠ
In	
 ﾠ compensating	
 ﾠ individuals	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ private	
 ﾠ loss	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ underlying	
 ﾠ
assumption	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠmechanism	
 ﾠ(usually	
 ﾠmoney)	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
provided	
 ﾠ immediately.	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ case	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠbecause	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdynamic	
 ﾠnature	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠdebits	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcredits.	
 ﾠ
Time	
 ﾠaffects	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠtwo	
 ﾠways.	
 ﾠFirst,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdebit	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
credit	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ occur	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ different	
 ﾠ times	
 ﾠ ("time	
 ﾠ discrepancy").	
 ﾠ Most	
 ﾠ
frequently	
 ﾠ(but	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠalways)	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠoccurs	
 ﾠrelatively	
 ﾠclose	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
present	
 ﾠwhile	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠgains	
 ﾠoccur	
 ﾠfurther	
 ﾠinto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfuture,	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠ
shown	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠFigure	
 ﾠ1.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠmain	
 ﾠreason	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠgain	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠdynamic	
 ﾠ
(i.e.,	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ planted	
 ﾠ tree	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ enhanced	
 ﾠ wetland	
 ﾠ provides	
 ﾠ ecosystem	
 ﾠ
services	
 ﾠgradually	
 ﾠover	
 ﾠtime.	
 ﾠDebits	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠfollow	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠgradual	
 ﾠpattern	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
decreasing	
 ﾠ loss	
 ﾠ (recovery)	
 ﾠ over	
 ﾠ time.	
 ﾠ Second,	
 ﾠ debits	
 ﾠ and/or	
 ﾠ credits	
 ﾠ
may	
 ﾠoccur	
 ﾠextremely	
 ﾠfar	
 ﾠinto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfuture,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠdemands	
 ﾠcontemplation	
 ﾠ
about	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcurrent	
 ﾠgeneration	
 ﾠ(the	
 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐makers)	
 ﾠshould	
 ﾠweigh	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ(uncertain)	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠfuture	
 ﾠgenerations,	
 ﾠwhen	
 ﾠthese	
 ﾠgenerations	
 ﾠ
are	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ able	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ express	
 ﾠ their	
 ﾠ preferences	
 ﾠ today.18	
 ﾠT h u s , 	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ discount	
 ﾠ
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18	
 ﾠThere	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠseveral	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠparallels	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠproblem:	
 ﾠbiodiversity	
 ﾠprotection,	
 ﾠ
endangered	
 ﾠspecies	
 ﾠprotection,	
 ﾠclimate	
 ﾠchange	
 ﾠimpacts,	
 ﾠstorage	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠradioactive	
 ﾠwaste,	
 ﾠ
thinning	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠozone	
 ﾠlayer,	
 ﾠpersistent	
 ﾠgroundwater	
 ﾠpollution,	
 ﾠminerals	
 ﾠdepletion,	
 ﾠetc.	
 ﾠ
See	
 ﾠWeitzman	
 ﾠ(1998).	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠfurther	
 ﾠlist	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠreferences	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠfound	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠNordhaus	
 ﾠ(1994)	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠLayton	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠLevine	
 ﾠ(2003).	
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 ﾠ
factor	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠused	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠadjust	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠoccurring	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠdifferent	
 ﾠtimes	
 ﾠ
so	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthey	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠcomparable.	
 ﾠ
As	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠCBA,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠweighting	
 ﾠsystem	
 ﾠused	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ based	
 ﾠ upon	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ
assumption	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ society	
 ﾠ exhibits	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ positive	
 ﾠ time	
 ﾠ preference,	
 ﾠ thus	
 ﾠ
reducing	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠv a l u e 	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ debits/credits	
 ﾠ occurring	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ future	
 ﾠ
(discounted)	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ increasing	
 ﾠv a l u e 	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ debits	
 ﾠ occurring	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ past	
 ﾠ
(compounded).	
 ﾠResource	
 ﾠflows	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠconsidered	
 ﾠanalogous	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠfinancial	
 ﾠ
annuities	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠrespect,	
 ﾠi.e.,	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠpresumed	
 ﾠimpatient	
 ﾠwhen	
 ﾠ
it	
 ﾠ comes	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ (direct	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ indirect)	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ consumption	
 ﾠ (NOAA	
 ﾠ 1999;	
 ﾠ
Cole	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠKriström	
 ﾠ2008).	
 ﾠ
In	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ licentiate	
 ﾠ counterpart	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ dissertation	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ explore	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
assumptions	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ consequences	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ discounting	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ flows	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ
greater	
 ﾠdetail	
 ﾠ(Cole	
 ﾠ2010).	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠconclude	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbasis	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠusing	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdiscount	
 ﾠ
factor	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠweight	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠaccording	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ"present	
 ﾠvalue"	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐established,	
 ﾠ although	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ specific	
 ﾠ value	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ weight	
 ﾠ attracts	
 ﾠ
disagreement	
 ﾠ due	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ extraordinary	
 ﾠ effect	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ discount	
 ﾠ rate	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ
have	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠconclusion	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠassessments.	
 ﾠBy	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠusing	
 ﾠ
a	
 ﾠdiscount	
 ﾠfactor,	
 ﾠwe	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠimplicitly	
 ﾠassuming	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠinfinitely	
 ﾠ
patient	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcan	
 ﾠwait	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠrestoration	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠoccur.	
 ﾠPlenty	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠevidence	
 ﾠexists	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠcontradict	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠassumption.	
 ﾠFrom	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpractical	
 ﾠmatter,	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdiscount	
 ﾠrate	
 ﾠ
also	
 ﾠhelps	
 ﾠwhen	
 ﾠcalculating	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠperpetual	
 ﾠdamage.	
 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
4  My	
 ﾠcontribution	
 ﾠ
Below	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ summarize	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ key	
 ﾠ economic	
 ﾠ contributions	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ my	
 ﾠ three	
 ﾠ
papers	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠthey	
 ﾠfit	
 ﾠtogether	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠassessment	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
resource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠcompensation.	
 ﾠ
4.1  Paper	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ"Scaling	
 ﾠelectrocution	
 ﾠprevention	
 ﾠmeasures..."	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠfirst	
 ﾠpaper	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠdissertation	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠdeveloped	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ2009	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ
provides	
 ﾠseveral	
 ﾠcontributions.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ First,	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ apply	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠREA	
 ﾠ method	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ case	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ past	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ projected	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠ injury	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ wind	
 ﾠ turbines.	
 ﾠA l t h o u g h 	
 ﾠf r e q u e n t l y 	
 ﾠ
applied	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠoil	
 ﾠspill	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠex	
 ﾠpost,	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠnever	
 ﾠbeen	
 ﾠapplied	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠ
power	
 ﾠ compensation,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ generally	
 ﾠ characterized	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ political	
 ﾠ
negotiation	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠconvenient	
 ﾠprojects	
 ﾠrather	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠlinking	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
welfare	
 ﾠgains.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠIn	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠparticular	
 ﾠapplication,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfocus	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠraptor	
 ﾠ
collisions	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠturbine	
 ﾠblades,	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠimpacts	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠ
power	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠgeneral	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠexpected	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbecome	
 ﾠincreasingly	
 ﾠrelevant	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
future	
 ﾠdue	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠstrong	
 ﾠdemand	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠCO2-ﾭ‐free	
 ﾠenergy.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠframework	
 ﾠ
put	
 ﾠforth	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠpaper	
 ﾠprovides	
 ﾠauthorities,	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠgroups,	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠpower	
 ﾠindustry	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠinterdisciplinary	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠ measures	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ suggested	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ Environmental	
 ﾠ Impact	
 ﾠ
Assessment	
 ﾠ(EIA)	
 ﾠhierarchy:	
 ﾠ"avoid	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐>	
 ﾠminimize	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐>	
 ﾠcompensate	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ Second,	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠsuggest	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠinnovative	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠcompensate	
 ﾠ
for	
 ﾠbird	
 ﾠlosses:	
 ﾠretrofitting	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠpower	
 ﾠlines	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠreduce	
 ﾠbird	
 ﾠelectrocution.	
 ﾠ
This	
 ﾠtype	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠhas	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠpreviously	
 ﾠbeen	
 ﾠsuggested	
 ﾠ
for	
 ﾠbird	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠreceived	
 ﾠpositive	
 ﾠfeedback	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠbiologists	
 ﾠ
at	
 ﾠ three	
 ﾠi n t e r n a t i o n a l 	
 ﾠconferences	
 ﾠ over	
 ﾠ two	
 ﾠ years.	
 ﾠ To	
 ﾠ support	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
argument	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠsuggest	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpractical	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠwhereby	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
power	
 ﾠ companies	
 ﾠ address	
 ﾠ electrocution	
 ﾠ mortality	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ existing	
 ﾠ power	
 ﾠ
lines,	
 ﾠ while	
 ﾠ utility	
 ﾠ companies	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ responsible	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ preventing	
 ﾠ
electrocution	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠall	
 ﾠnew	
 ﾠpower	
 ﾠlines.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠresults	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠstudy	
 ﾠprovide	
 ﾠ
impetus	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠimproving	
 ﾠelectrocution	
 ﾠprobability	
 ﾠmodels	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠensure	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠcost	
 ﾠeffective.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ Third,	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ worked	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ interdisciplinary	
 ﾠ setting	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ biologists	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ
Norway	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠincorporate	
 ﾠcomplex	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠinformation	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠimpact	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠfarm	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠbirds	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpotential	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠgains	
 ﾠassociated	
 ﾠ
with	
 ﾠ power	
 ﾠ line	
 ﾠ retrofitting.	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ required	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ comprehensive	
 ﾠ
understanding	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠpopulation	
 ﾠmodel	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠwhat	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠimplies	
 ﾠ
in	
 ﾠterms	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠimpacts.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ Fourth,	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ advanced	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ existing	
 ﾠ methodological	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ using	
 ﾠ
bird-ﾭ‐years	
 ﾠ (BY)	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐monetary	
 ﾠ metric	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ EA.	
 ﾠ Specifically,	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ
adapted	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcalculations	
 ﾠBY	
 ﾠlosses	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcase	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐lived	
 ﾠraptor	
 ﾠ
species	
 ﾠ (white	
 ﾠ tailed	
 ﾠ eagle)	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ interpreted	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ impacts.	
 ﾠ
Further,	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠhighlight	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠkey	
 ﾠlimitation	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠmethod	
 ﾠ
does	
 ﾠ not	
 ﾠ address	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ real	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐offs	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ choosing	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ
compensate	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠparticular	
 ﾠsite.	
 ﾠInstead,	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠsimple	
 ﾠprovides	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠ
approach,	
 ﾠ given	
 ﾠt hat	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ already	
 ﾠ been	
 ﾠ deemed	
 ﾠ
appropriate.	
 ﾠ Together	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ paper	
 ﾠ III	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ stress	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ fact	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐offs	
 ﾠmust	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠaddressed	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠex	
 ﾠante	
 ﾠsetting	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
order	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ assess	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠs o c i a l 	
 ﾠp r o f i t a b i l i t y 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ policy	
 ﾠ
approach.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
4.2  Paper	
 ﾠII	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ"Wind	
 ﾠpower	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbirds	
 ﾠ..."
	
 ﾠ 	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠmotivation	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠPaper	
 ﾠII	
 ﾠcame	
 ﾠafter	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠtrip	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠScotland	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠattend	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
Raptor	
 ﾠ Research	
 ﾠ Foundation	
 ﾠ annual	
 ﾠ meeting	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ ornithology	
 ﾠ
conference.	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠapplied	
 ﾠtoo	
 ﾠlate	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠable	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠpresent	
 ﾠpaper	
 ﾠI,	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠdecided	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠ attend	
 ﾠ anyway	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ order	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ "float	
 ﾠ my	
 ﾠ idea"	
 ﾠ about	
 ﾠ electrocution	
 ﾠ
prevention	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠturbine	
 ﾠlosses.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠIt	
 ﾠturned	
 ﾠ
out	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠfateful	
 ﾠtrip.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠbiologists	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠspoke	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠfully	
 ﾠenforced	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠidea	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠenthusiastically	
 ﾠ
pointed	
 ﾠme	
 ﾠtoward	
 ﾠresearchers	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠwere	
 ﾠworking	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠelectrocution	
 ﾠ
prevention	
 ﾠissues	
 ﾠwho,	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠturn,	
 ﾠwere	
 ﾠeven	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠeager	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠsupport	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠ
idea	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠprovided	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpotential	
 ﾠoutlet	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠresults	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠtheir	
 ﾠresearch.	
 ﾠ
I	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠintroduced	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠseveral	
 ﾠresearchers	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠfound	
 ﾠmyself	
 ﾠexplaining	
 ﾠ
my	
 ﾠidea	
 ﾠrepeatedly,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠhoned	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠability	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠspeak	
 ﾠ"economics"	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 35	
 ﾠ
ecologists.	
 ﾠ After	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ late	
 ﾠ night	
 ﾠ discussion	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ bar	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ couple	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
fellow	
 ﾠ PhD	
 ﾠ students	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ ecology	
 ﾠ about	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ anthropocentric	
 ﾠ basis	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
compensation,	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠdecided	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠown	
 ﾠPhD	
 ﾠcontributions	
 ﾠwould	
 ﾠ
be	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠimprove	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdialog	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdisciplines.	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠset	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠwork	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠ
outline	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpaper	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠflight	
 ﾠhome.	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠprocess	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwriting	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpaper	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠonly	
 ﾠhelpful	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠown	
 ﾠ
development	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠeconomist,	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠwould	
 ﾠlike	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠhope	
 ﾠ
it	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠeven	
 ﾠfruitful	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠecologists	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠread	
 ﾠseveral	
 ﾠearly	
 ﾠdrafts	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠ paper	
 ﾠ( I 	
 ﾠc e r t a i n l y 	
 ﾠb e n e f i t t e d 	
 ﾠt h r o u g h 	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠb e t t e r 	
 ﾠu n d e r s t a n d i n g 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠ
raptor	
 ﾠpopulation	
 ﾠdynamics).	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠDuring	
 ﾠone	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠseveral	
 ﾠdrafts	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠ
was	
 ﾠtrying	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠexplain	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠreadership	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ
was	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠ"us	
 ﾠhumans,"	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠfound	
 ﾠjust	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠway	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠexpress	
 ﾠit:	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠ
is	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbirds.19	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
Thus,	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠcontribution	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠnothing	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠcreating	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠdialog	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠ
ecologists.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠAdmittedly,	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠdid	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠdiscover	
 ﾠany	
 ﾠnew	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠtheory	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠ
insight,	
 ﾠ but	
 ﾠ rather	
 ﾠ tried	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ communicate	
 ﾠ fundamental	
 ﾠ economic	
 ﾠ
assumptions	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠway	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠmight	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠhelpful	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠfurther	
 ﾠcollaboration.	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠ main	
 ﾠ contribution	
 ﾠ was	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ clarify	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ intended	
 ﾠ goal	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ"no	
 ﾠnet	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠwel f are"	
 ﾠrather	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠ
biodiversity	
 ﾠ per	
 ﾠ se,	
 ﾠ although	
 ﾠ admittedly	
 ﾠ both	
 ﾠ goals	
 ﾠ lead	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ
measurement	
 ﾠchallenges.	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠhope	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠlays	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfoundation	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠfuture	
 ﾠ
interdisciplinary	
 ﾠwork	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠme	
 ﾠlater	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠmy	
 ﾠcareer.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
4.3  Paper	
 ﾠIII	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠ"Equity	
 ﾠover	
 ﾠefficiency..."	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠpurpose	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠpaper	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠconsider	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠimplications	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
alternative	
 ﾠmethods	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠcompensation.	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠcritique	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠconventional	
 ﾠEquivalency	
 ﾠAnalysis	
 ﾠ(EA)	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠsuggest	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠ
alternative	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠbased	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	
 ﾠanalysis	
 ﾠ(CBA).	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠ
key	
 ﾠ finding	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ inescapable	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐offs	
 ﾠ facing	
 ﾠ
society	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠcompensating	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠignored	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠ
framework.	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ proposed	
 ﾠ CBA	
 ﾠ framework	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ more	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ line	
 ﾠ with	
 ﾠ
governments'	
 ﾠincreasing	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠstill	
 ﾠlimited	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠuse	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠ steer	
 ﾠ society's	
 ﾠ scarce	
 ﾠ resources	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ variety	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ
challenges.	
 ﾠ
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19	
 ﾠBecause	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠexpression	
 ﾠ"for	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbirds"	
 ﾠrefers	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠsomething	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠobjectionable	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠ
not	
 ﾠworth	
 ﾠdoing,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdouble	
 ﾠmeaning	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠrelevant:	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠeconomics	
 ﾠsuggests	
 ﾠ
that	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠworthwhile	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠit's	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠ(just)	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbirds.	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
4.3.1  Critique	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
To	
 ﾠ compensate	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ damage	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ polluter	
 ﾠi n c u r s 	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠ
number	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcosts	
 ﾠincluding:	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
1)  the	
 ﾠcost	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠimmediate	
 ﾠclean	
 ﾠup	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠresponse;	
 ﾠ
2)  the	
 ﾠ cost	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ speeding	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ recovery	
 ﾠ (i.e.,	
 ﾠ returning	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
damaged	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ(or	
 ﾠtoward)	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐damage	
 ﾠbaseline);	
 ﾠ
3)  the	
 ﾠdiminution	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠvalue	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠ(interim	
 ﾠloss),	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
required	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠdoes	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠquickly	
 ﾠreturn	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbaseline;	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
4)  the	
 ﾠr e a s o n a b l e 	
 ﾠc o s t s 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠa s s e s s i n g 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠd a m a g e s 	
 ﾠ( e . g . , 	
 ﾠd a t a 	
 ﾠ
collection,	
 ﾠassessment,	
 ﾠmonitoring,	
 ﾠetc).	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠ conventional	
 ﾠ EA	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ scaling	
 ﾠ focuses	
 ﾠ exclusively	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ
component	
 ﾠ 3	
 ﾠ (equity	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ victim	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ injury)	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ
assumes	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ cost	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ carrying	
 ﾠ out	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ adequate	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ
project	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠincurred	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpolluter.	
 ﾠBut	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvictim	
 ﾠowns	
 ﾠpart	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
polluting	
 ﾠ firm	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ opportunity	
 ﾠ cost	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ compensating	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ damage	
 ﾠ
(including	
 ﾠ all	
 ﾠ four	
 ﾠ components	
 ﾠ above)	
 ﾠ maybe	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ so	
 ﾠ high	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
individual's	
 ﾠ utility	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ fall	
 ﾠ following	
 ﾠ compensation.	
 ﾠ In	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ case,	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ
suggest	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠimplies	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠopportunity	
 ﾠcost	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠrather	
 ﾠ
than	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ private	
 ﾠ cost	
 ﾠ incurred	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ polluter	
 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠa s 	
 ﾠsociety's	
 ﾠ scarce	
 ﾠ
resources	
 ﾠ used	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ could	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ used	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ alternative	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠ(which	
 ﾠcosts	
 ﾠless	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠprovides	
 ﾠgreater	
 ﾠbenefits)	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠ
for	
 ﾠprivate	
 ﾠinvestment	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpolluting	
 ﾠfirm	
 ﾠ(which	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠlead	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠ
benefits	
 ﾠ such	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ increased	
 ﾠ producer	
 ﾠ surplus	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ increased	
 ﾠ
employment).	
 ﾠ By	
 ﾠ ignoring	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ opportunity	
 ﾠ cost	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ compensating	
 ﾠ
damage,	
 ﾠ EA	
 ﾠ assumes	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ all	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ payments	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ
increasing.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
4.3.2  The	
 ﾠproposed	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠ
An	
 ﾠalternative	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠequity	
 ﾠcriterion	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠconsider	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠefficiency	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
carrying	
 ﾠ out	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ project.	
 ﾠ A	
 ﾠ CBA-ﾭ‐scaled	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ
payment	
 ﾠcompares	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtotal	
 ﾠbenefit	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠproject	
 ﾠ(what	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠindividual	
 ﾠ
is	
 ﾠwilling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠpay	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠobtain	
 ﾠit)	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠproject's	
 ﾠopportunity	
 ﾠcosts	
 ﾠ(what	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠ
individual	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ willing	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ give	
 ﾠ up).	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ proposed	
 ﾠ scaling	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ
analogous	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠdetermining	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠoptimal	
 ﾠlevel	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠpollution	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsense	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠoptimal	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠpayment	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠzero,	
 ﾠpositive,	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠnegative	
 ﾠ
(i.e.,	
 ﾠadditional	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠshould	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠallowed).	
 ﾠAn	
 ﾠoptimal	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠ
payment	
 ﾠ R*	
 ﾠ assumes	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ society	
 ﾠ faces	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠ between	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠprotection	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠproduction,	
 ﾠjust	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠpollution	
 ﾠ
abatement	
 ﾠassumes	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠtrade	
 ﾠoff	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠclean	
 ﾠair	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠproduction.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
4.3.3  Implications	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠanalysis	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠ paper	
 ﾠ identifies	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ number	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ implications	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ two	
 ﾠ scaling	
 ﾠ
approaches.	
 ﾠ
•  The	
 ﾠoptimal	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠpayment	
 ﾠscaled	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠacknowledges	
 ﾠ
environmental	
 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐offs	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ scaling	
 ﾠ compensation.	
 ﾠ Whereas	
 ﾠ
regulatory	
 ﾠintervention	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠair	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠwater	
 ﾠpollution	
 ﾠexternalities	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠ
generally	
 ﾠ motivated	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ acknowledged	
 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠb e t w e e n 	
 ﾠ
economic	
 ﾠgrowth	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠprotection,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdominant	
 ﾠuse	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠaims	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠreturn	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbaseline	
 ﾠstate	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠworld	
 ﾠ
regardless	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcosts	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠwould	
 ﾠseem	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠimply	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠmakers	
 ﾠneed	
 ﾠ
not	
 ﾠconsider	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐offs	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠscaling.	
 ﾠBut	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
counter-ﾭ‐intuitive	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ scarcity	
 ﾠ perspective.	
 ﾠ CBA	
 ﾠ scaling	
 ﾠ
acknowledges	
 ﾠs o c i e t y ' s 	
 ﾠs c a r c e 	
 ﾠr e s o u r c e s 	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠcompares	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
marginal	
 ﾠ costs	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ marginal	
 ﾠ benefits	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ
payment.	
 ﾠ
•  EA	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠdeveloped	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠtool	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠimplement	
 ﾠregulations	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠwere	
 ﾠ
motivated	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠPolluter	
 ﾠPays	
 ﾠPrinciple	
 ﾠ(EC	
 ﾠ2000).	
 ﾠThus,	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠ
based	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠpriori	
 ﾠassumption	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠusers	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠdamaged	
 ﾠ
resource	
 ﾠ own	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ polluter	
 ﾠ must	
 ﾠ pay.	
 ﾠ In	
 ﾠ other	
 ﾠ
words,	
 ﾠ EA	
 ﾠ seems	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ imply	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ particular	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ function,	
 ﾠ
which	
 ﾠ assigns	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠl o w e r 	
 ﾠw e i g h t 	
 ﾠt o 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠp o l l u t e r ' s 	
 ﾠu t i l i t y 	
 ﾠ( w h i c h 	
 ﾠ
decreases	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠincurring	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠcost)	
 ﾠrelative	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
pollutees'	
 ﾠutility	
 ﾠ(which	
 ﾠincreases	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠreceiving	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠ
project).	
 ﾠThese	
 ﾠtypes	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠimplicit	
 ﾠweights	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠtypically	
 ﾠabsent	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
conventional	
 ﾠ"efficiency-ﾭ‐driven"	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠwhere	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠ
of	
 ﾠthose	
 ﾠwho	
 ﾠown	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpolluting	
 ﾠfirm	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠno	
 ﾠless	
 ﾠimportant	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
welfare	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthose	
 ﾠwho	
 ﾠsuffer	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠits	
 ﾠdamaging	
 ﾠactivity.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
•  EA	
 ﾠ assumes	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ marginal	
 ﾠ benefit	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ individual	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ
additional	
 ﾠunit	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠconstant	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠincreasing.	
 ﾠThus,	
 ﾠ
all	
 ﾠ else	
 ﾠ equal,	
 ﾠ larger	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ injuries	
 ﾠ require	
 ﾠ larger	
 ﾠ
compensatory	
 ﾠpayments.	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠassumes	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠmarginal	
 ﾠbenefit	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
additional	
 ﾠ units	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ declines	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ supply	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ	
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 ﾠ
restored	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠi n c r e a s e s . 	
 ﾠT h i s 	
 ﾠl e a d s 	
 ﾠt o 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠf i n d i n g 	
 ﾠt h a t 	
 ﾠC B A 	
 ﾠ
scaling	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠrecommend	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠlarger	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠpayment	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠ
scaling	
 ﾠif	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠrestored	
 ﾠresource	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠundersupplied	
 ﾠpublic	
 ﾠgood,	
 ﾠ
which	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ likely	
 ﾠ given	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ environmental	
 ﾠ goods	
 ﾠ tend	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ
characterized	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐exclusivity	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐rivalry.	
 ﾠ
•  The	
 ﾠpaper	
 ﾠsuggests	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠcredibility	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠlie	
 ﾠbehind	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠmakers'	
 ﾠ
choice	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ equity-ﾭ‐focused	
 ﾠ EA	
 ﾠ method	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ expense	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ
efficiency.	
 ﾠT he	
 ﾠ mechanism	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ ensuring	
 ﾠ efficiency	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ price	
 ﾠ
determined	
 ﾠ by	
 ﾠ supply	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ demand	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ competitive	
 ﾠ market.	
 ﾠ
Without	
 ﾠmarkets	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠdifficult	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠmeasure	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠresource's	
 ﾠopportunity	
 ﾠ
costs,	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ thus	
 ﾠ 'efficient'	
 ﾠ resource	
 ﾠ allocations.	
 ﾠ Thus	
 ﾠ equity	
 ﾠ (EA)	
 ﾠ
may	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠpreferred	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠefficiency	
 ﾠ(CBA)	
 ﾠbecause	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠmakers	
 ﾠdo	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠ
believe	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐market	
 ﾠ ecosystem	
 ﾠ services	
 ﾠ can	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ priced	
 ﾠ
efficiently,	
 ﾠleading	
 ﾠthem	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠstress	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠadequacy	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtransfer	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠ
polluter	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠvictim	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠstandard	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠmeasuring	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsuccess	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ
resource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠpayment.	
 ﾠ
•  A	
 ﾠpractical	
 ﾠimplication	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠanalysis	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠmakers	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠ
scaling	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠreasonable	
 ﾠcomplement	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠscaling.	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠcould	
 ﾠ
provide	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠstarting	
 ﾠpoint	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠdamage	
 ﾠassessment,	
 ﾠbut	
 ﾠCBA	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠ
could	
 ﾠhelp	
 ﾠhighlight	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠinevitable	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐offs	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠorder	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠaim	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠ
more	
 ﾠ socially	
 ﾠ optimal	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ outcome	
 ﾠ than	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ one	
 ﾠ
suggested	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠvictim-ﾭ‐focused	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠapproach.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
4.3.4  Conclusion	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠcontributions	
 ﾠ
There	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ strong	
 ﾠ economic	
 ﾠ arguments	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ protecting	
 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠ
compensating	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠloss	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠecosystem	
 ﾠservices	
 ﾠupon	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠ
welfare	
 ﾠ depends.	
 ﾠ There	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ also	
 ﾠ strong	
 ﾠ equity	
 ﾠ arguments	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ
compensating	
 ﾠindividuals	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠharmed	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamage.	
 ﾠ
But	
 ﾠprotecting	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠenhancing	
 ﾠecosystem	
 ﾠservices	
 ﾠrequires	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠ
spend	
 ﾠtime	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠresources	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠare	
 ﾠnecessarily	
 ﾠunavailable	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠother	
 ﾠ
purposes,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠimprove	
 ﾠwelfare.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠ key	
 ﾠ contributions	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ paper	
 ﾠ include	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ following.	
 ﾠ First,	
 ﾠ
several	
 ﾠpapers	
 ﾠhave	
 ﾠanalyzed	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠequity	
 ﾠpoint	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠview	
 ﾠ(have	
 ﾠ
victims	
 ﾠ been	
 ﾠ properly	
 ﾠ compensated).	
 ﾠ My	
 ﾠ analysis	
 ﾠd i f f e r s 	
 ﾠi n 	
 ﾠt h a t 	
 ﾠi t 	
 ﾠ
focuses	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ efficiency.	
 ﾠ An	
 ﾠ efficiency	
 ﾠ critique	
 ﾠ leads	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
conclusion	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ polluters'	
 ﾠ expenditures	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ represent	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ
opportunity	
 ﾠcost.	
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 ﾠ
Second,	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠsuggest	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnew	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠbased	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠCBA,	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠ
considers	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	
 ﾠbetween	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠgrowth	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠ
protection.	
 ﾠ Previous	
 ﾠl i t e r a t u r e 	
 ﾠh a s 	
 ﾠn o t 	
 ﾠi d e n t i f i e d 	
 ﾠt h i s 	
 ﾠt r a d e -ﾭ‐offs,	
 ﾠ
assuming	
 ﾠinstead	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠall	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠincreasing.	
 ﾠ
Third,	
 ﾠ I	
 ﾠ discuss	
 ﾠi m p l i c a t i o n s 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠE A 	
 ﾠm e t h o d 	
 ﾠn o t 	
 ﾠp r e v i o u s l y 	
 ﾠ
identified	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠliterature.	
 ﾠFor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠimplies	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠparticular	
 ﾠshape	
 ﾠ
for	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ social	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ function,	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ favors	
 ﾠ victims	
 ﾠ over	
 ﾠ polluters.	
 ﾠ
Further,	
 ﾠI	
 ﾠsuggest	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠmakers'	
 ﾠfocus	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠequity-ﾭ‐focused	
 ﾠEA	
 ﾠ
scaling	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ expense	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ efficiency	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ due	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ
credibility	
 ﾠ problem:	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ lack	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ credible	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ pricing	
 ﾠ
resources	
 ﾠ may	
 ﾠ have	
 ﾠ led	
 ﾠ instead	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ focus	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ adequacy	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
transfer	
 ﾠ from	
 ﾠ polluter	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ victim	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ standard	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ measuring	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
success	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠpayment.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
4.4  Suggestions	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠfuture	
 ﾠresearch	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
The	
 ﾠfindings	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠthree	
 ﾠpapers	
 ﾠsuggest	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnumber	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠpotentially	
 ﾠ
fruitful	
 ﾠlines	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠfuture	
 ﾠresearch.	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
•  The	
 ﾠlegal	
 ﾠrequirements	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠex	
 ﾠpost	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠhave	
 ﾠstimulated	
 ﾠ
an	
 ﾠeconomics	
 ﾠliterature	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠassess	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠimpacts.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠincreasing	
 ﾠ
demand	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ ex	
 ﾠ ante	
 ﾠc o m p e n s a t i o n 	
 ﾠ( e . g . , 	
 ﾠb i o d i v e r s i t y 	
 ﾠo f f s e t s ) 	
 ﾠ
requires	
 ﾠadditional	
 ﾠeconomic	
 ﾠinput	
 ﾠbecause	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠsetting	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠwhich	
 ﾠ
these	
 ﾠ assessments	
 ﾠa r e	
 ﾠ conducted	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ different	
 ﾠf r o m 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠex	
 ﾠ post	
 ﾠ
scenarios.	
 ﾠ For	
 ﾠ example,	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ difficult	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ determine	
 ﾠ when	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠrequired	
 ﾠunder	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ"avoid-ﾭ‐minimize-ﾭ‐compensate"	
 ﾠ
hierarchy	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ there	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ little	
 ﾠ guidance	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠh o w 	
 ﾠm u c h 	
 ﾠ
avoidance/minimization	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ enough	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠw hen	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ
threshold	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ been	
 ﾠ reached	
 ﾠ( s e e 	
 ﾠP a p e r 	
 ﾠI I ) . 	
 ﾠThus	
 ﾠ we	
 ﾠ need	
 ﾠ more	
 ﾠ
information	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠwhat	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠwilling	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠtrade	
 ﾠwhen	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠcomes	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠ
resource	
 ﾠ loss	
 ﾠ( e . g . , 	
 ﾠb i o d i v e r s i t y 	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠe c o s y s t e m 	
 ﾠs e r v i c e s ) 	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠ
infrastructure	
 ﾠdevelopment	
 ﾠ(e.g.,	
 ﾠwind	
 ﾠpower,	
 ﾠrailroads,	
 ﾠetc).	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠ
information	
 ﾠwill	
 ﾠhelp	
 ﾠimprove	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠscaling	
 ﾠprocess.	
 ﾠ
•  The	
 ﾠ ecosystem	
 ﾠ service	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ valuation	
 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	
 ﾠw h e r e 	
 ﾠe c o l o g i c a l 	
 ﾠ
production	
 ﾠfunctions	
 ﾠidentify	
 ﾠquantity	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠecosystem	
 ﾠservices	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠ
benefit	
 ﾠ mankind	
 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	
 ﾠm a y 	
 ﾠp r o v e 	
 ﾠt o 	
 ﾠb e 	
 ﾠu s e f u l 	
 ﾠi n 	
 ﾠa 	
 ﾠc o m p e n s a t o r y 	
 ﾠ
context.	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠrecent	
 ﾠreport	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠUS	
 ﾠ(NRC	
 ﾠ2011)	
 ﾠsuggests	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠ
approach	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ advantages	
 ﾠ over	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ HEA/REA	
 ﾠ approach	
 ﾠ when	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ 40	
 ﾠ
comes	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠcompensating	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠnon	
 ﾠmarginal	
 ﾠenvironmental	
 ﾠdamages	
 ﾠ
(e.g.,	
 ﾠ2010	
 ﾠGulf	
 ﾠoil	
 ﾠspill).	
 ﾠFor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠsuggests	
 ﾠbroadening	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
definition	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ"services"	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠHEA	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠinclude	
 ﾠecosystem	
 ﾠservice	
 ﾠvalues	
 ﾠ
for	
 ﾠ humans,	
 ﾠ rather	
 ﾠ than	
 ﾠ assuming	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ habitat	
 ﾠ services	
 ﾠ are	
 ﾠ
proportional	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ human	
 ﾠ welfare	
 ﾠ losses.	
 ﾠF u t u r e 	
 ﾠr e s e a r c h 	
 ﾠs h o u l d 	
 ﾠ
consider	
 ﾠ how	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ information	
 ﾠ could	
 ﾠ be	
 ﾠ used	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ improve	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
flexibility	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠidentifying	
 ﾠcompensation	
 ﾠmeasures	
 ﾠwhile	
 ﾠmaintaining	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐based	
 ﾠrestriction	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcompensatory	
 ﾠmechanism.	
 ﾠ
•  Given	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ likely	
 ﾠ continued	
 ﾠ reliance	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ simplified	
 ﾠ HEA/REA	
 ﾠ
approach,	
 ﾠ research	
 ﾠ should	
 ﾠ focus	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ conditions	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ which	
 ﾠ
ecological	
 ﾠmetrics	
 ﾠmay	
 ﾠrepresent	
 ﾠreasonable	
 ﾠproxies	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠwelfare.	
 ﾠ
While	
 ﾠH E A / R E A 	
 ﾠavoids	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠd i f f i c u l t i e s 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠi n f o r m i n g 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠp u b l i c 	
 ﾠ
about	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpotential	
 ﾠwelfare	
 ﾠconsequences	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠchange,	
 ﾠit	
 ﾠ
places	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ significant	
 ﾠ responsibility	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ interdisciplinary	
 ﾠ team	
 ﾠ
conducting	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ assessment.	
 ﾠ Future	
 ﾠ research	
 ﾠ could	
 ﾠ
identify	
 ﾠhow	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠwhen	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠprovides	
 ﾠsatisfactory	
 ﾠresults	
 ﾠ
for	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠwhole.	
 ﾠ
•  The	
 ﾠecological	
 ﾠfield	
 ﾠneeds	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠcontribute	
 ﾠwith	
 ﾠspecific	
 ﾠquantifiable	
 ﾠ
and	
 ﾠ verifiable	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ projects	
 ﾠ that	
 ﾠ address	
 ﾠ species	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ
habitat	
 ﾠ loss.	
 ﾠ Further,	
 ﾠ we	
 ﾠ need	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ close	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ knowledge	
 ﾠ gap	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ
assessing	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ success	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ compensation	
 ﾠ projects.	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ gap	
 ﾠ will	
 ﾠ
become	
 ﾠ a	
 ﾠ significant	
 ﾠ problem	
 ﾠ as	
 ﾠ compensatory	
 ﾠ requirements	
 ﾠ
increase.	
 ﾠOur	
 ﾠrestoration	
 ﾠtechnology	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠfairly	
 ﾠyoung.	
 ﾠCan	
 ﾠour	
 ﾠability	
 ﾠ
to	
 ﾠ repair	
 ﾠ damaged	
 ﾠ ecosystems	
 ﾠ improve	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ future	
 ﾠ and,	
 ﾠ if	
 ﾠ so,	
 ﾠ
what	
 ﾠ does	
 ﾠ this	
 ﾠ imply	
 ﾠ about	
 ﾠ possibilities	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ postponing	
 ﾠ
compensation	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠfavoring	
 ﾠdevelopment	
 ﾠtoday?	
 ﾠ
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